Dialectical Approach to Legal Arguing and Legal Argumentation

The article is devoted to legal argumentation, namely to its research by dialectical approach. The aim of the article is to determine characteristic features of dialectical approach to legal argumentation. Dialectical approach to the research of legal argumentation should include philosophical, theoretical, empirical components. Philosophical component of legal argumentation research consists in the critical conception of rationality i.e. the philosophical axiomatic idea about rationality of legal argumentation, which is systematically tested within discourse or critical discussion. Dialectical theoretical model of legal argumentation ensures mutual acceptability of legal argumentation by the parties. Dialectical approach deals with legal argumentation mainly in the “context of justification.” Dialectical approach to legal arguing implies specific standard of soundness of the argumentation – acceptability standard. Empirical component of legal argumentation includes reconstruction of argumentation and its weighting (analytic component) as well as analysis of particular legal reasoning (practical component). Dialectical approach highlights hermeneutical nature of legal reasoning. Dialectical approach to legal argumentation lets us assume some ontological issues concerning legal argumentation. Legal argumentation is considered as the form of rational communication of particular persons to reach mutual acceptability of legally important conclusions within the procedure of discussion. Legal argumentation is the result of such impact embodied in acceptability of legally binding issues within the procedure of rational discussion.

EPISTEMOLOGI TASAWUF; DARI CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY KE CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION

Dari keseluruhan model ilmu keislaman, tasawuf adalah yang paling luas jangkauan epistemologi dan sekaligus yang paling kontroversi. Keluasan tersebut karena tasawuf mencakup aspek jahir dan aspek batin kehidupan manusia. Bahwa tasawuf juga mengidentifikasi jenis keilmuan yang tidak didapat dari olah fikir atau proses transfer, tetapi melalui olah batin (tazkiat nafs), riyadhah dan mujahadah. Dengan metode diskursus-analisis atas literatur-literatur kesufian, disini ditelaah, model-model epistemologi yang terdapat dalam tasawuf. Hasilnya bahwa tasawuf memiliki keragaman epistemologi, baik dari aspek discovery (jalan suluk), discourse (kontemplatif-filosofis) hingga justification (analisis-filosofis-teologis). Kesemua model epistemologi ini merupakan kesatuan utuh yang membuat tasawuf semakin diminati oleh orang-orang dari berbagai latar dan orientasi.

Making Sense of the Relationship Between Adaptive Thinking and Heuristics in Evolutionary Psychology

In recent years, quite a few evolutionary psychologists have come to embrace a heuristic interpretation of the discipline. They claim that, no matter how methodologically incomplete, adaptive thinking works fine as a good heuristic that effectively reduces the hypothesis space by generating novel and promising hypotheses that can eventually be empirically tested. The purpose of this article is to elucidate the use of heuristics in evolutionary psychology, thereby clarifying the role adaptive thinking has to play. To that end, two typical heuristic interpretations—Machery’s "bootstrap strategy" and Goldfinch’s heuristically streamlined evolutionary psychology—are examined, focusing on the relationship between adaptive thinking and heuristics. The article draws two primary conclusions. The first is that the reliability of the heuristic hypothesis generation procedure (in the context of discovery) should count no less than the conclusiveness of the final testing procedure (in the context of justification) in establishing scientific facts; nature does not always get the last word. Philosophy also counts. The second is that adaptive thinking constitutes a core heuristic in evolutionary psychology that provides the discipline with its raison d'être, but this is only possible when adaptive thinking is substantiated with sufficient historical underpinnings.

Knowing by Imagining1

This chapter explains the cognitive role of the imagination as a means to knowledge, permitting the offline use of cognitive faculties in both mental and non-mental simulation to assess counterfactual conditionals, in an analogue of online updating and prediction on the basis of new information. Other modal claims can be assessed similarly. This role involves the context of justification as well as the context of discovery. It substantiates the examples in Chapter 10, where imagination is treated as a means to knowledge. An analogy is sketched between the development of hypotheses in the imagination and the tableau method in deductive logic, which casts light on our ability to imagine an F when there is no F that we are imagining. It is suggested that such an overall cognitive role for the imagination makes sense on evolutionary grounds, including the distinction between voluntary and involuntary uses of the imagination.

The process of information systems theorizing as a discursive practice

Although there has been a growing understanding of theory in the information systems field in recent years, the process of theorizing is rarely addressed with contributions originating from other disciplines and little effort to coherently synthesize them. Moreover, the field’s view of theorizing has traditionally focused on the context of justification with an emphasis on collection and analysis of data in response to a research question with theory often added as an afterthought. To fill this void, we foreground the context of discovery that emphasizes the creative and often serendipitous articulation of theory by emphasizing this important stage of theorizing as a reflective and highly iterative practice. Specifically, we suggest that information systems researchers engage in foundational theorizing practices to form the discourse, problematize the phenomenon of interest and leverage paradigms and deploy generative theorizing practices through analogies, metaphors, myths and models to develop the information systems discourse. To illustrate the detailed workings of these discursive practices, we draw on key examples from information systems theorizing.

Improving human interaction research through ecological grounding (in press at Collabra)

In psychology, we tend to follow the general logic of falsificationism: we separate the ‘context of discovery’ (how we come up with theories) from the ‘context of justification’ (how we test them). However, when studying human interaction, separating these contexts can lead to theories with low ecological validity that do not generalize well to life outside the lab. We propose borrowing research procedures from well-established inductive methodologies in interaction research during the process of discovering new regularities and analyzing natural data without being led by theory. We introduce research procedures including the use of naturalistic study settings, analytic transcription, collections of cases, and data analysis sessions, and illustrate these with examples from a successful cross-disciplinary study. We argue that if these procedures are used systematically and transparently throughout a research cycle, they will lead to more robust and ecologically valid theories about interaction within psychology and, with some adaptation, can enhance the reproducibility of research across many other areas of psychological science.

Improving Human Interaction Research through Ecological Grounding

In psychology, we tend to follow the general logic of falsificationism: we separate the ‘context of discovery’ (how we come up with theories) from the ‘context of justification’ (how we test them). However, when studying human interaction, separating these contexts can lead to theories with low ecological validity that do not generalize well to life outside the lab. We propose borrowing research procedures from well-established inductive methodologies in interaction research during the process of discovering new regularities and analyzing natural data without being led by theory. We introduce research procedures including the use of naturalistic study settings, analytic transcription, collections of cases, and data analysis sessions, and illustrate these with examples from a successful cross-disciplinary study. We argue that if these procedures are used systematically and transparently throughout a research cycle, they will lead to more robust and ecologically valid theories about interaction within psychology and, with some adaptation, can enhance the reproducibility of research across many other areas of psychological science.

Vyřešil Hans Albert problémy Popperova kritického racionalismu?

Kritický racionalismus je v české akademické diskusi spojován především se jménem sira Karla R. Poppera. Cílem tohoto článku je komparativně rozšířit tento obraz prostřednictvím myšlenek Hanse Alberta, Popperova následovníka v německé jazykové oblasti. Konkrétně bude diskutována problematika rozlišení kontextu objevu a kontextu zdůvodnění. Na základě vybraných problémů, s nimiž se Popper nedokázal zcela vypořádat, bude ukázáno, jak tyto problémy do své koncepce involvuje a jak je řeší Albert. Zajímavý na tomto srovnání je především fakt, že Albert pojímá původně filosoficko-vědní problémy v širším filosofickém rámci. Díky tomu se mu podařilo uchopit kritický racionalismus – jak sám Popper uznal – s odstupem a v nových souvislostech. In the Czech academic environment, the critical rationalism is associated above all with the name of Sir Karl R. Popper. The aim of this paper is to comparatively extend this view via thoughts of Popper’s German follower Hans Albert. Specifically, the issue of the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification will be discussed here. Against the background of selected problems, which Popper did not adequately solve, I will demonstrate how Albert involves these problems in his own conception and how he solves them. The interesting fact about this comparison is that Albert approaches the originally philosophical-scientific problems in a wider philosophical context. Thanks to this wider context he grasps the critical rationalism from a distance and in new connections, as Popper accepted himself.