Context of Discovery/Context of Justification

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Jitka Paitlová

Kritický racionalismus je v české akademické diskusi spojován především se jménem sira Karla R. Poppera. Cílem tohoto článku je komparativně rozšířit tento obraz prostřednictvím myšlenek Hanse Alberta, Popperova následovníka v německé jazykové oblasti. Konkrétně bude diskutována problematika rozlišení kontextu objevu a kontextu zdůvodnění. Na základě vybraných problémů, s nimiž se Popper nedokázal zcela vypořádat, bude ukázáno, jak tyto problémy do své koncepce involvuje a jak je řeší Albert. Zajímavý na tomto srovnání je především fakt, že Albert pojímá původně filosoficko-vědní problémy v širším filosofickém rámci. Díky tomu se mu podařilo uchopit kritický racionalismus – jak sám Popper uznal – s odstupem a v nových souvislostech. In the Czech academic environment, the critical rationalism is associated above all with the name of Sir Karl R. Popper. The aim of this paper is to comparatively extend this view via thoughts of Popper’s German follower Hans Albert. Specifically, the issue of the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification will be discussed here. Against the background of selected problems, which Popper did not adequately solve, I will demonstrate how Albert involves these problems in his own conception and how he solves them. The interesting fact about this comparison is that Albert approaches the originally philosophical-scientific problems in a wider philosophical context. Thanks to this wider context he grasps the critical rationalism from a distance and in new connections, as Popper accepted himself. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 198-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nik Rushdi Hassan ◽  
Lars Mathiassen ◽  
Paul Benjamin Lowry

Although there has been a growing understanding of theory in the information systems field in recent years, the process of theorizing is rarely addressed with contributions originating from other disciplines and little effort to coherently synthesize them. Moreover, the field’s view of theorizing has traditionally focused on the context of justification with an emphasis on collection and analysis of data in response to a research question with theory often added as an afterthought. To fill this void, we foreground the context of discovery that emphasizes the creative and often serendipitous articulation of theory by emphasizing this important stage of theorizing as a reflective and highly iterative practice. Specifically, we suggest that information systems researchers engage in foundational theorizing practices to form the discourse, problematize the phenomenon of interest and leverage paradigms and deploy generative theorizing practices through analogies, metaphors, myths and models to develop the information systems discourse. To illustrate the detailed workings of these discursive practices, we draw on key examples from information systems theorizing.


2020 ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson

This chapter explains the cognitive role of the imagination as a means to knowledge, permitting the offline use of cognitive faculties in both mental and non-mental simulation to assess counterfactual conditionals, in an analogue of online updating and prediction on the basis of new information. Other modal claims can be assessed similarly. This role involves the context of justification as well as the context of discovery. It substantiates the examples in Chapter 10, where imagination is treated as a means to knowledge. An analogy is sketched between the development of hypotheses in the imagination and the tableau method in deductive logic, which casts light on our ability to imagine an F when there is no F that we are imagining. It is suggested that such an overall cognitive role for the imagination makes sense on evolutionary grounds, including the distinction between voluntary and involuntary uses of the imagination.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gottfried Gabriel

Intuition steht einerseits für Anschaulichkeit, andererseits für Unmittelbarkeit und dann auch für die Verbindung von beidem. Der Vortrag behandelt in erster Linie das Verständnis des Intuitiven im Sinne des Unmittelbaren. Von psychologischer Seite wird betont, dass intuitive «Bauchentscheidungen» häufig zuverlässiger seien als diskursive Begründungen. In erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischer Hinsicht steht damit insbesondere die Rolle der Logik auf dem Prüfstand.<BR>Nach einem begriffsgeschichtlichen Überblick wird der Gegensatz zwischen intuitiver und diskursiver Erkenntnis an Beispielen aus Literatur, Kunst, Naturwissenschaft und Rechtswissenschaft untersucht, mit dem Ergebnis, dass der Gegensatz in ein komplementäres Verhältnis zu überführen ist. Es erweist sich, dass die Intuition auch in den Wissenschaften eine wesentliche Erkenntnisquelle mit Blick auf den heuristischen Entdeckungszusammenhang (<EM>context of discovery</EM>) ausmacht, die intuitiv gewonnenen Ergebnisse aber letztlich einer diskursiven Rechtfertigung im Rahmen des Begründungszusammenhangs (<EM>context of justification</EM>) bedürfen.<BR>


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