scholarly journals If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mousa Mohammadian
Keyword(s):  
Zombie Argument

scholarly journals Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not

2019 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
A Priori Entailment

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

Is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument Self-Refuting? And How

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-132
Author(s):  
Julietta Rose ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Zombie Argument

What Does the Zombie Argument Prove?

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-280
Author(s):  
Miklós Márton
Keyword(s):  
Zombie Argument

scholarly journals DEKARTIŠKAS DUALIZMO ĮRODYMAS ŠIUOLAIKINĖJE SĄMONĖS FILOSOFIJOJE

Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Dimensional Theory ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Modal Semantic

Straipsnyje analitinės filosofijos požiūriu analizuojamas Descartes’o sąmonės ir kūno skirtingumo įrodymas, siekiant atskleisti jo panašumus su šiuolaikinėje sąmonės filosofijoje populiariu Davido Chalmerso pateiktu „zombio“ mintiniu eksperimentu ir juo grindžiamu dualizmo įrodymu. Siekiama parodyti, kad šiuolaikinis modaline semantikos analize grindžiamas įrodymo variantas yra techniškai sudėtingesnis ir atsparesnis fizikalistinei kritikai, tačiau jis paremtas nutylėta ir nepagrįsta episteminio sąvokų skaidrumo prielaida, kuri išskirstina kaip viena originalaus dekartiško įrodymo silpnybių. Tai leidžia tvirtinti, kad Antoine’o Arnauld kritika, pateikta Descartes’o įrodymui, lygiai taip pat sėkmingai taikytina ir Chalmerso antifizikalistiniams samprotavimams.Reikšminiai žodžiai: sąmonės filosofija, dualizmo įrodymai, „zombio“ mintinis eksperimentas, fizikalizmas. DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MINDJonas Dagys Summary The paper analizes Descartes’ argument for the mind–body dualism from the perspective of contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. It attempts to show that the popular zombie argument, mostly due to David Chalmers, is reminescent of this Cartesian proof of dualism. The intended conclusion is that although the contemporary argument invokes modal semantic analysis and two-dimensional theory of conceptual content and so is technically more difficult and resistant to certain physicalist criticism, it neverhteless rests on an unstated and unjustified assumption. This assumption is that of epistemic transparency and completeness of at least some of our concepts. It was the same assumption that had been identified as one of the weaknesses of the original Cartesian argument for dualism. Therefore, one could argue that Arnauld’s objections to Descartes are well applicable to Chalmers’ antiphysicalist arguments without substantial modification.Keywords: philosophy of mind, arguments for dualism, zombie argument, physicalism.

Chalmer's Zombie Argument

2011 ◽  
pp. 327-329
Author(s):  
Amy Kind
Keyword(s):  
Zombie Argument

Is the Theatre a Zombie? On the Successful Failures of Émile Zola

2018 ◽  
Vol 136 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Rebellato
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Emile Zola ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
The Mind

AbstractNaturalist theatre, in its late-nineteenth-century incarnation, and particularly in the work of Émile Zola, is often seen as advancing a physicalist view of the mind, where all mind states can be reduced to brain states. The novels and the plays do not uniformly or unambiguously support this analysis, so is the theory or the practice wrong? Physicalism is an idea that has had a recent renaissance, helped by the discoveries of neuroscience. Nevertheless I express some caution about the claims made for the eradication of free will. A range of thought experiments in the philosophy of mind have cast doubt on physicalism, culminating in David Chalmers’s much-debated zombie argument. I argue that zombies and their analogues represented deep social anxieties in the late nineteenth century, and make repeated appearances in Naturalism. The essay goes on to suggest that Naturalism should be considered to have conducted thought experiments, rather than just to have attempted to embody the theory on stage. Turning to John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, I suggest that theatre-making itself may be a kind of thought experiment model of the mind.

scholarly journals Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Danilo Fraga Dantas
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Computational Power ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Rational Reflection ◽  
Finite Memory ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
Fundamental Physical

The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence phi is ideally negatively conceivable iff phi cannot be ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that if its premises are true, the negative zombie argument is neither conclusive (valid) nor a priori. First, I argue that the argument is sound iff there exists a finite ideal reasoner R for a logic x with the relevant properties which believes <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. A finite reasoner is a reasoner with finite memory and finite computational power.  I argue that if x has the relevant properties and R is finite, then x must be nonmonotonic and R may only approach ideallity at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. For example, for q=`someone is conscious'. I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither conclusive nor a priori (the choice of q relies on empirical information).

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