Action without Intention: Some Remarks of Analytical Philosophy Applied to the Theory of Social Action

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

Interpretation of Sense/Meaning in the Communicative Field

The past century has shown the conversion of a so-called anthropological turn which began with works of Franz Brentano, into a linguistic turn (Richard Rorty’s term). The philosophy of language took the place of what once had been classical theory of cognition. It has become either a kind of epistemology, or analytical philosophy, or even a general theory of knowledge called in Greece, Germany and Russia gnoseology (from Greek: gnosis - knowledge). It is necessary to make some clarifications in understanding the current intellectual situation in the field of communication theory. Communication is a term containing a root morpheme ‘uni’ with the meaning of “one”, “unity”. For our purposes, the English word “conversation” is more suitable because, denoting a talk, it actually has the primary existential meaning of “living together”. Developing this topic, we can rely on the classic research in the field of theory and practice of communication conducted over several decades by the American specialist in the field of social psychology Deborah Tannen.

Hermeneutics of Aristotle and Hermeneutics of Sophists in Terms of Dialogue Philosophy. Part II. From Sophists to Modernity

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine of sophists, some elements of its dialogism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already charted the paths for modern thought two and a half thousand years ago. The second part of the article discusses the forms of the dialogic thinking that have survived in philosophy after the sophists and the role of the sophists' hermeneutics in the formation of modern philosophy of dialogue.

Bimal K. Matilal's Philosophy: Language, Realism, Dharma, and Ineffability

The article considers the theoretical and practical consequences of the so-called "soft" version of epistemological realism in Bimal K. Matilal's philosophical project. The author offers an analytical view on Matilal's philosophy, which helps to understand it in a broader prospective, comparing his arguments on perception and objectivity with contemporary arguments in Western analytical philosophy; in fact, it is possible to view Matilal not only as the proponent of revised Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika approach, but also as the follower of realistic view on language, following L. Wittgenstein, W. Quine, H. Putnam and M. Dummett. Despite the fact that such interpretation may sound diverse or multivocal, it nevertheless helps to better understand both lineages of argumentation: the critical review of the impossibility of private language can be compared in both Western and Indian philosophical discourses, which leads into the domain of social epistemology. The second part of the article discusses the ethical arguments on the vulnerability of moral virtues, and the place of Dharma as a term in moral philosophy. Poetical and metaphorical language appears to be a fruitful strategy to discover the ineffable - and also via negativa and catuṣkoṭi - which is shown by Matilal on the example of the unacceptability of lying. The ethical ineffability and its interconnection with Matilal's commentaries on practical wisdom play the crucial part in the interpretations of Dharmaśāstra texts.

Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: Controversies of the French Interpretation

The author of the article focuses on the matter of Wittgenstein's philosophy reception in France. The reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy was quite late and led to different, sometimes opposite interpretations of his thought, even among French analytical philosophers. Applying a sociological approach to the problem of reception, the author identifies factors that hindered the penetration of the ideas of analytical philosophy in France, including the powerful institutionalization of philosophy in France with its inherent traditionalism and conservatism, fully expressed national character of French philosophy, as well as the extremely polemical character of French analytical philosophy, the transformation of the choice of this tradition of philosophizing into an ethical and political choice. These factors are illustrated by an analysis of Wittgenstein's conflicting interpretation of Jacques Bouveresse and Sandra Laugier. If the first creates an image of Wittgenstein as Anti-Husserl, blaming the phenomenologist for ignoring ordinary language, the second proposes a phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein's ideas using the philosophy of ordinary language. The article shows how opposing interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy reproduce the internal conflicts of the French philosophical field.

Silencing Without Uptake

Catharine MacKinnon has claimed that some pornography “silences” women. Some work in feminist analytical philosophy suggests it does so by depriving them of the capacity to perform certain speech acts, such as (and most prominently) the speech act of sexual refusal. This has been termed the silencing of “illocutionary disablement.” Critics object that this silencing claim involves a contentious thesis about the success conditions of speech acts such as sexual refusal: that the auditor’s comprehension, or “uptake,” of the speaker’s intent is required for the speech act to come off. I try to show that the illocutionary disablement claim can do without the uptake condition as it has heretofore been formulated. Even if audience uptake is not a success condition for each individual act of sexual refusal, reciprocity of a certain kind is still a condition of women’s continuing ability to engage the refusal illocution. When pornography disrupts the conditions for that reciprocity it will effectuate illocutionary disablement. I also consider whether the illocutionary disablement under consideration here is properly thought of as “silencing.”

Meaning and Other Problems of the Semantics of Ordinary Language (Foreword to the Ukrainian Translation of H.P. Grice’s Article “Meaning”).

The foreword to the very first Ukrainian translation of H. P. Grice’s article “Meaning” deals with the personality of the famous British-American philosopher, a representative of analytical philosophy, and the importance of his work in the field of semantics and ordinary language philosophy. Translators of this article focus on the features and subtleties of translation into Ukrainian. They drive attention to some concepts, for instance “belief”, “intention”, that cannot be unambiguously translated into Ukrainian, therefore a contextual translation of such concepts is methodologically justified.

Question of Authenticity of Steel Sheet Roof Cover on Traditional Housing Units in Urban Environment

Elaborating on the theory of analytical philosophy and conservation doctrine, and a case study of a selected sample, the paper discusses the authenticity of the secondary roof cover of steel sheets on traditional Bosnian houses built for housing or economic purposes. Although such steel sheet replica of a shingle or šimla wooden cover is registered and defined as authentic in rural areas, its authenticity in urban traditional areas, where it can also be found, although not as often, has not been doctrinally examined. Comparative analysis of results of theoretical base and statistical data obtained from the selected sample determines the context where it is possible and recommendable to treat the steel sheet roof cover as authentic when carrying out restoration and reconstruction.

The Noumenal Morass: Post-Kantian Representationalism and Its Relationalist Critique in the Light of Strong Disjunctivism

This epistemological essay addresses the issue of representational content’s existence in the case of true direct knowledge. Contrary answers to it are considered as a basis for the distinction between representationalism and relationalism. The first part of the essay contains a critical analysis of the fundamental features of German Idealism as a kind of representationalism, which determined the main epistemological trend of continental philosophy in the form of post-Kantian representationalism. In the second part, after a brief excursion into certain contemporary continental issues, the current discussion between representationalism and relationalism in analytical philosophy is considered. It is concluded that relationalism, while correctly recognizing the nature of direct perception as being without representational content, is incapable of ensuring the unity of direct perception and a perceptual judgment, and a solution is proposed that could lead out of this epistemological impasse.