scholarly journals Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not

2019 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
A Priori Entailment

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

scholarly journals Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-55
Author(s):  
Dusko Prelevic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Modal Rationalism ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
Minimal Physicalism

Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.

Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment

2010 ◽  
Vol 155 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Diaz-Leon
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
A Priori Entailment

A Priori Physicalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 370-386
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
The Mind ◽  
A Priori Entailment ◽  
Complete Account

Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.

A Priori Entailment

2006 ◽  
pp. 198-217
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Entailment

scholarly journals Bidimensionalismo epistémico y el espacio ontológico modal

2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (117) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
José Tomás Alvarado Marambio
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
David Chalmers

Este trabajo presenta las líneas centrales del bidimensionalismo epistémico defendido recientemente por David Chalmers, y considera, en particular, las motivaciones a las que la semántica debería servir en la conexión entre modalidad metafísica y epistémica. Después de esta presentación, se indican tres dificultades: (i) no se ha diferenciado suficientemente de las semánticas bidimensionales contextuales tradicionales; (ii) la noción de justificación a priori sobre la que se ha desarrollado requiere urgentemente mayor precisión; y (iii) los defensores del esquema han olvidado completamente los casos de “contingencias fuertes”.

scholarly journals DEKARTIŠKAS DUALIZMO ĮRODYMAS ŠIUOLAIKINĖJE SĄMONĖS FILOSOFIJOJE

Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Dimensional Theory ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Modal Semantic

Straipsnyje analitinės filosofijos požiūriu analizuojamas Descartes’o sąmonės ir kūno skirtingumo įrodymas, siekiant atskleisti jo panašumus su šiuolaikinėje sąmonės filosofijoje populiariu Davido Chalmerso pateiktu „zombio“ mintiniu eksperimentu ir juo grindžiamu dualizmo įrodymu. Siekiama parodyti, kad šiuolaikinis modaline semantikos analize grindžiamas įrodymo variantas yra techniškai sudėtingesnis ir atsparesnis fizikalistinei kritikai, tačiau jis paremtas nutylėta ir nepagrįsta episteminio sąvokų skaidrumo prielaida, kuri išskirstina kaip viena originalaus dekartiško įrodymo silpnybių. Tai leidžia tvirtinti, kad Antoine’o Arnauld kritika, pateikta Descartes’o įrodymui, lygiai taip pat sėkmingai taikytina ir Chalmerso antifizikalistiniams samprotavimams.Reikšminiai žodžiai: sąmonės filosofija, dualizmo įrodymai, „zombio“ mintinis eksperimentas, fizikalizmas. DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MINDJonas Dagys Summary The paper analizes Descartes’ argument for the mind–body dualism from the perspective of contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. It attempts to show that the popular zombie argument, mostly due to David Chalmers, is reminescent of this Cartesian proof of dualism. The intended conclusion is that although the contemporary argument invokes modal semantic analysis and two-dimensional theory of conceptual content and so is technically more difficult and resistant to certain physicalist criticism, it neverhteless rests on an unstated and unjustified assumption. This assumption is that of epistemic transparency and completeness of at least some of our concepts. It was the same assumption that had been identified as one of the weaknesses of the original Cartesian argument for dualism. Therefore, one could argue that Arnauld’s objections to Descartes are well applicable to Chalmers’ antiphysicalist arguments without substantial modification.Keywords: philosophy of mind, arguments for dualism, zombie argument, physicalism.

scholarly journals Ideal reasoners don’t believe in zombies

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Danilo Fraga Dantas
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Computational Power ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Rational Reflection ◽  
Finite Memory ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
Fundamental Physical

The negative zombie argument states that p&~q is ideally negatively conceivable and, therefore, possible, what would entail that physicalism is false (Chalmers, 2002, 2010}. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and $q$ is a phenomenal truth. A sentence phi is ideally negatively conceivable iff phi cannot be ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that if its premises are true, the negative zombie argument is neither conclusive (valid) nor a priori. First, I argue that the argument is sound iff there exists a finite ideal reasoner R for a logic x with the relevant properties which believes <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. A finite reasoner is a reasoner with finite memory and finite computational power.  I argue that if x has the relevant properties and R is finite, then x must be nonmonotonic and R may only approach ideallity at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe <>(p&~q) on the basis of not believing p->q on a priori basis. For example, for q=`someone is conscious'. I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither conclusive nor a priori (the choice of q relies on empirical information).

scholarly journals Mass additivity and a priori entailment

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 192 (5) ◽  
pp. 1373-1392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelvin J. McQueen
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Entailment

Application of cross correlation to HREM images of surfaces

1987 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 754-755
Author(s):  
D. E. Luzzi ◽  
L. D. Marks ◽  
M. I. Buckett
Keyword(s):  
Cross Correlation ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Matrix Material ◽  
Correlation Method ◽  
Accurate Knowledge ◽  
Complex Image ◽  
Fourier Filtering ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Low Pass ◽  
Data Reduction Technique

As the HREM becomes increasingly used for the study of dynamic localized phenomena, the development of techniques to recover the desired information from a real image is important. Often, the important features are not strongly scattering in comparison to the matrix material in addition to being masked by statistical and amorphous noise. The desired information will usually involve the accurate knowledge of the position and intensity of the contrast. In order to decipher the desired information from a complex image, cross-correlation (xcf) techniques can be utilized. Unlike other image processing methods which rely on data massaging (e.g. high/low pass filtering or Fourier filtering), the cross-correlation method is a rigorous data reduction technique with no a priori assumptions.We have examined basic cross-correlation procedures using images of discrete gaussian peaks and have developed an iterative procedure to greatly enhance the capabilities of these techniques when the contrast from the peaks overlap.

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