scholarly journals Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wilde
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Medical Practitioners ◽  
Mechanistic Reasoning

AbstractAt least historically, it was common for medical practitioners to believe causal hypotheses on the basis of standalone mechanistic reasoning. However, it is now widely acknowledged that standalone mechanistic reasoning is insufficient for appropriately believing a causal hypothesis in medicine, thanks in part to the so-called problem of masking. But standalone mechanistic reasoning is not the only type of mechanistic reasoning. When exactly then is it appropriate to believe a causal hypothesis on the basis of mechanistic reasoning? In this paper, I argue that it has proved difficult to provide a satisfying answer to this question. I also argue that this difficulty is predicted by recent work in knowledge-first epistemology. I think this shows that recent work in epistemology has important implications for practice in the philosophy of science. It is therefore worth paying closer attention in the philosophy of science to this recent work in knowledge-first epistemology.

Mechanistic versus Functional Understanding

2019 ◽  
pp. 209-230
Author(s):  
Tania Lombrozo ◽  
Daniel Wilkenfeld
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Functional Understanding

Many natural and artificial entities can be predicted and explained both mechanistically, in term of parts and proximate causal processes, as well as functionally, in terms of functions and goals. Do these distinct “stances” or “modes of construal” support fundamentally different kinds of understanding? Based on recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as empirical evidence from cognitive and developmental psychology, this chapter argues for the “weak differentiation thesis”: the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding are distinct in that they involve importantly different objects. The chapter also considers more tentative arguments for the “strong differentiation thesis”: the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding involve different epistemic relationships between mind and world.

Implications of Recent Work in Philosophy of Science for the Role of Operational Definition in Psychology

1971 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Wallach
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Operational Definition ◽  
Indirect Sources ◽  
Psychological Concepts

Philosophers of science have recently shown that not only extreme operationism but any operationist position faces very serious difficulties. Psychology has tended to take for granted that only one kind of terms, terms in the “data language” or “observation terms,” have direct empirical meaning, and that the empirical meaning of all other terms is given by their operational definitions. Strong arguments have now been put forth indicating both that such “observation terms” are impossible to distinguish and that there are other indirect sources of empirical meaning besides operational definitions. If these arguments are correct, two conclusions follow: (a) It can no longer be maintained that psychological concepts must be “reconstructed” in terms of operational definitions; and (b) There is no longer any basis for failing to require the justification of operational definitions used in psychological research.

Rationality and Alienation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 449-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Class Formation ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
English Speaking

Two decades ago, problems of alienation and fetishism were the focus of most English speaking studies of Marx’s philosophy. More recent work on Marx and Marxist themes has tended to avoid these questions in favor of discussions of explanation, exploitation, distributive justice and problems of class formation and co-ordination. The latter set of problems seem more readily addressable, if not always more tractable, using contemporary tools drawn from the philosophy of science, as well as methods of decision theory, game theory, and welfare economics. But the change in emphasis has not been without costs; gains in clarity and rigor have come at the price of abandoning Marx's most fundamental criticism of capitalism as a way of life. I shall argue that it is no coincidence that the shift to ‘rational choice’ Marxism has had precisely that cost.

Recent Work in Philosophy of Science

1966 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 478-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernan McMullin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Work

Engineering Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthonie Meijers ◽  
Wybo Houkes
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Nuclear Fusion ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Alternative Analysis ◽  
Engineering Knowledge ◽  
Test Reactor

This chapter seeks to advance our understanding of engineering knowledge. The authors distinguish existing views of engineering knowledge as subordinating, contrasting, or assimilating it to (natural-)scientific knowledge. After identifying shortcomings and useful elements of each view, the authors offer ingredients for an alternative analysis, focusing on knowledge produced in the design of high-tech systems. This analysis builds on elements of existing views of engineering knowledge, as well as recent work in the philosophy of science. The authors argue that such design involves sets of epistemic activities, resulting in a variety of rules, where both activities and rules are governed by a distinctive set of epistemic and non-epistemic values. To illustrate this analysis, the authors use the development of the nuclear-fusion test reactor ITER as a running example.

scholarly journals SAD computers and two versions of the Church–Turing Thesis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Euclidean Geometry ◽  
Turing Computability ◽  
Effective Version ◽  
Physical Possibility ◽  
Non Euclidean Geometry ◽  
The Church

Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These barriers suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth’s analogy between non-Turing computability and non-Euclidean geometry, showing that it is a non-sequitur. I conclude that the Effective version of the Church–Turing Thesis is unaffected by SAD computation.Published in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60.4: 765–92.

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