An analysis on secure coding using symbolic execution engine

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joon-Ho Kim ◽  
Myung-Chul Ma ◽  
Jae-Pyo Park
2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 573-597
Author(s):  
István Kádár

In a software system, most of the runtime failures may come to light only during test execution, and this may have a very high cost. To help address this problem, a symbolic execution engine called RTEHunter, which has been developed at the Department of Software Engineering at the University of Szeged, is able to detect runtime errors (such as null pointer dereference, bad array indexing, division by zero) in Java programs without actually running the program in a real-life environment. Applying the theory of symbolic execution, RTEHunter builds a tree, called a symbolic execution tree, composed of all the possible execution paths of the program. RTEHunter detects runtime issues by traversing the symbolic execution tree and if a certain condition is fulfilled the engine reports an issue. However, as the number of execution paths increases exponentially with the number of branching points, the exploration of the whole symbolic execution tree becomes impossible in practice. To overcome this problem, different kinds of constraints can be set up over the tree. E.g. the number of symbolic states, the depth of the execution tree, or the time consumption could be restricted. Our goal in this study is to find the optimal parametrization of RTEHunter in terms of the maximum number of states, maximum depth of the symbolic execution tree and search strategy in order to find more runtime issues in a shorter time. Results on three open-source Java systems demonstrate that more runtime issues can be detected in the 0 to 60 basic block-depth levels than in deeper ones within the same time frame. We also developed two novel search strategies for traversing the tree based on the number of null pointer references in the program and on linear regression that performs better than the default depth-first search strategy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar Karna ◽  
Jinbo Du ◽  
Haihao Shen ◽  
Hao Zhong ◽  
Jiong Gong ◽  
...  

Electronics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Fayozbek Rustamov ◽  
Juhwan Kim ◽  
Jihyeon Yu ◽  
Hyunwook Kim ◽  
Joobeom Yun

Greybox Fuzzing is the most reliable and essentially powerful technique for automated software testing. Notwithstanding, a majority of greybox fuzzers are not effective in directed fuzzing, for example, towards complicated patches, as well as towards suspicious and critical sites. To overcome these limitations of greybox fuzzers, Directed Greybox Fuzzing (DGF) approaches were recently proposed. Current DGFs are powerful and efficient approaches that can compete with Coverage-Based Fuzzers. Nevertheless, DGFs neglect to accomplish stability between usefulness and proficiency, and random mutations make it hard to handle complex paths. To alleviate this problem, we propose an innovative methodology, a target-oriented hybrid fuzzing tool that utilizes a fuzzer and dynamic symbolic execution (also referred to as a concolic execution) engine. Our proposed method aims to generate inputs that can quickly reach the target sites in each sequence and trigger potential hard-to-reach vulnerabilities in the program binary. Specifically, to dive deep into the target binary, we designed a proposed technique named BugMiner, and to demonstrate the capability of our implementation, we evaluated it comprehensively on bug hunting and crash reproduction. Evaluation results showed that our proposed implementation could not only trigger hard-to-reach bugs 3.1, 4.3, 2.9, 2.0, 1.8, and 1.9 times faster than Hawkeye, AFLGo, AFL, AFLFast, QSYM, and ParmeSan respectively but also scale to several real-world programs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Xiang Gao ◽  
Bo Wang ◽  
Gregory J. Duck ◽  
Ruyi Ji ◽  
Yingfei Xiong ◽  
...  

Automated program repair is an emerging technology that seeks to automatically rectify program errors and vulnerabilities. Repair techniques are driven by a correctness criterion that is often in the form of a test suite. Such test-based repair may produce overfitting patches, where the patches produced fail on tests outside the test suite driving the repair. In this work, we present a repair method that fixes program vulnerabilities without the need for a voluminous test suite. Given a vulnerability as evidenced by an exploit, the technique extracts a constraint representing the vulnerability with the help of sanitizers. The extracted constraint serves as a proof obligation that our synthesized patch should satisfy. The proof obligation is met by propagating the extracted constraint to locations that are deemed to be “suitable” fix locations. An implementation of our approach (E xtract F ix ) on top of the KLEE symbolic execution engine shows its efficacy in fixing a wide range of vulnerabilities taken from the ManyBugs benchmark, real-world CVEs and Google’s OSS-Fuzz framework. We believe that our work presents a way forward for the overfitting problem in program repair by generalizing observable hazards/vulnerabilities (as constraint) from a single failing test or exploit.


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