Resource Allocation Based on DEA and Non-Cooperative Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 2231-2249
Author(s):  
Menghan Wang ◽  
Lin Li ◽  
Qianzhi Dai ◽  
Fangnan Shi
2019 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 30-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katty Rohoden ◽  
Rebeca Estrada ◽  
Hadi Otrok ◽  
Zbigniew Dziong

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez

Abstract The Coase theorem states that where there are externalities and no transaction costs resource allocation is Pareto-optimal and independent of the stakeholders’ legal position. This result has been challenged many times. In the cooperative game approach to resource allocation, the refutation is made by constructing a three-person game which has an empty core under one set of liability rules—which implies that optimal allocations are coalitionally unstable–and a nonempty core under another set. In this example, however, the probability that the core is non-empty is rather high (5/6). Yet, even if coalitionally stable Pareto-optimal arrangements are likely, to establish the plain validity of the Coase theorem it must be shown that the legal neutrality statement also holds. We show that for the three-person cooperative game example mentioned above, the probability that the two assertions of the Coase theorem hold can be as low as 3/8.


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