Li, Wei 李巍, From Analysis of Semantics to Reconstruction of Argument: A New Characterization of Early Chinese Philosophy 從語義分析到道理重構——早期中國哲學的新刻畫

Dao ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting-mien Lee
2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Paul J. D'Ambrosio

This review article defends Brook Ziporyn against the charge, quite common in graduate classroom discussions, if not in print, that his readings of early Chinese philosophy are ‘overly Buddhist’. These readings are found in his three most recent books: Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, and Emptiness and Omnipresence: An Essential Introduction to Tiantai Buddhism. His readings are clearly Buddhist-influenced, but this is not in and of itself problematic. The core issue is rather to what degree these ‘Buddhist elements’ are actually already existent in, and have subsequently been carried over from, early Chinese thought in the development of Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, some scholars of Chinese Buddhism have pointed out that much of the vocabulary, concepts, and logic used in schools such as Tiantai may owe more to Daoist influences than to Buddhist ones. Accordingly, Ziporyn’s ‘overly Buddhist’ approach might simply be an avenue of interpretation that is actually quite in line with the thinking in the early texts themselves, albeit one that is less familiar (i.e. an early Chinese Buddhist or Ziporyn’s approach). The article also aims to show how Ziporyn’s theory concerning the importance of ‘coherence’ in early and later Chinese philosophy is also quite important in his above work on Tiantai Buddhism, Emptiness and Omnipresence. While in this work Ziporyn almost entirely abstains from using the language of coherence, much of it actually rests on a strong coherence-based foundation, thereby demonstrating not Ziporyn’s own prejudice, but rather the thoroughgoing importance and versatility of his arguments on coherence. Indeed, understanding the importance of coherence in his readings of Tiantai Buddhism (despite the fact that he does not explicitly use coherence-related vocabulary) only bolsters the defense against the claims that he makes ‘overly Buddhist’ readings of early Chinese philosophy.


Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

This chapter elaborates on the connections between oneness, moral agency, and spontaneity by distinguishing between two general kinds of spontaneity: untutored spontaneity, which is characteristic of traditions such as Daoism, and cultivated spontaneity, representative of traditions such as Confucianism. This discussion intersects with oneness on the matter of “metaphysical comfort,” the sense of oneness, harmony, and happiness that one experiences when acting or reacting spontaneously, on either the untutored or cultivated model. Daoists argued quite plausibly that this experience goes hand in hand with certain kinds of untutored spontaneity, but an important objective of the chapter is to show that even cultivated spontaneity can provide the same comfort. The chapter makes the case that both forms of spontaneity are familiar, though largely unrecognized, in all forms of human life and that the descriptions provided, inspired by early Chinese philosophy, offer important theoretical resources for philosophy today.


2021 ◽  
pp. 18-65
Author(s):  
Alexus McLeod

Chapter 1 lays out the dominant views of self, agency, and moral responsibility in early Chinese philosophy. The reason for this is that these views inform the ways early Chinese thinkers approach mental illness, as well as the role they see it playing in self-cultivation as a whole (whether they view it as problematic or beneficial, for example). This chapter offers a view of a number of dominant conceptions of mind, body, and agency in early Chinese thought, through a number of philosophical and medical texts. It covers the Confucian view of personhood as role-based and communal, and the Zhuangist deconstructive view of the self. Finally, the chapter includes an argument that early Chinese thinkers recognized a distinction between mind and body, and that mind was dealt with as a separate category, thus making the topic of “mental illness” possible.


The Monist ◽  
1908 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-509
Author(s):  
Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki ◽  

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