Self, Mind and Body, Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-65
Author(s):  
Alexus McLeod

Chapter 1 lays out the dominant views of self, agency, and moral responsibility in early Chinese philosophy. The reason for this is that these views inform the ways early Chinese thinkers approach mental illness, as well as the role they see it playing in self-cultivation as a whole (whether they view it as problematic or beneficial, for example). This chapter offers a view of a number of dominant conceptions of mind, body, and agency in early Chinese thought, through a number of philosophical and medical texts. It covers the Confucian view of personhood as role-based and communal, and the Zhuangist deconstructive view of the self. Finally, the chapter includes an argument that early Chinese thinkers recognized a distinction between mind and body, and that mind was dealt with as a separate category, thus making the topic of “mental illness” possible.

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Paul J. D'Ambrosio

This review article defends Brook Ziporyn against the charge, quite common in graduate classroom discussions, if not in print, that his readings of early Chinese philosophy are ‘overly Buddhist’. These readings are found in his three most recent books: Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, and Emptiness and Omnipresence: An Essential Introduction to Tiantai Buddhism. His readings are clearly Buddhist-influenced, but this is not in and of itself problematic. The core issue is rather to what degree these ‘Buddhist elements’ are actually already existent in, and have subsequently been carried over from, early Chinese thought in the development of Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, some scholars of Chinese Buddhism have pointed out that much of the vocabulary, concepts, and logic used in schools such as Tiantai may owe more to Daoist influences than to Buddhist ones. Accordingly, Ziporyn’s ‘overly Buddhist’ approach might simply be an avenue of interpretation that is actually quite in line with the thinking in the early texts themselves, albeit one that is less familiar (i.e. an early Chinese Buddhist or Ziporyn’s approach). The article also aims to show how Ziporyn’s theory concerning the importance of ‘coherence’ in early and later Chinese philosophy is also quite important in his above work on Tiantai Buddhism, Emptiness and Omnipresence. While in this work Ziporyn almost entirely abstains from using the language of coherence, much of it actually rests on a strong coherence-based foundation, thereby demonstrating not Ziporyn’s own prejudice, but rather the thoroughgoing importance and versatility of his arguments on coherence. Indeed, understanding the importance of coherence in his readings of Tiantai Buddhism (despite the fact that he does not explicitly use coherence-related vocabulary) only bolsters the defense against the claims that he makes ‘overly Buddhist’ readings of early Chinese philosophy.


Author(s):  
Alexus McLeod

This book offers a picture of madness as a category and a tool in the early Chinese tradition, giving an account of how early Chinese thinkers developed a conception of mental illness connected to both medicine and ethics, particularly in the Warring States and Han periods. Specifically, it is concerned with the connections between madness, mental illness in general, and philosophical positions on personhood, moral agency, responsibility, and social identity. Madness is a near universal category in human thought. In early China, madness (kuang ?) has particular unique forms, shaped through consideration of the features of mind and body, cultural norms, and illness and health. While madness and other forms of mental illness were taken as either foils or ideals by different thinkers in early China, they were nearly always contrasted with operability, proper communal development, and progress on a specifically moral path. This book explores these conceptions of madness in early Chinese thought.


Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

This chapter elaborates on the connections between oneness, moral agency, and spontaneity by distinguishing between two general kinds of spontaneity: untutored spontaneity, which is characteristic of traditions such as Daoism, and cultivated spontaneity, representative of traditions such as Confucianism. This discussion intersects with oneness on the matter of “metaphysical comfort,” the sense of oneness, harmony, and happiness that one experiences when acting or reacting spontaneously, on either the untutored or cultivated model. Daoists argued quite plausibly that this experience goes hand in hand with certain kinds of untutored spontaneity, but an important objective of the chapter is to show that even cultivated spontaneity can provide the same comfort. The chapter makes the case that both forms of spontaneity are familiar, though largely unrecognized, in all forms of human life and that the descriptions provided, inspired by early Chinese philosophy, offer important theoretical resources for philosophy today.


Author(s):  
Leigh K. Jenco

This chapter argues that the ongoing debate about the “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” (Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing) raises issues relevant to the globalization of knowledge. On its surface, the debate concerns whether Chinese thought can be meaningfully understood as “philosophy”; more generally, it asks how, in the very process of enabling their translation into presumably more “modern” languages of intellectual expression, the terms of a specific academic discipline shape and constrain the development of particular forms of knowledge. The debate reveals the power inequalities that underlie attempts to include culturally marginalized bodies of thought within established disciplines and suggests the range of alternatives that are silenced or forgotten when this “inclusion” takes place. Even contemporary invocations of “Chinese philosophy” are often unable to comprehend the stakes of the debate for many of its Chinese participants, who link the debate to enduring questions about the capacity of indigenous Chinese academic terms to compete successfully with Euro-American ones. These debates may illuminate questions currently motivating comparative political theory.


1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractIn this article, the insights of Chinese philosophy and economic game theory are examined with a focus on international negotiations. While Chinese philosophy texts have existed for over 2,000 years, game theory is a more recent tool of strategic analysis. We illustrate four strategic negotiation principles based on these two theories with stylized examples specifically designed to help negotiators involved in international contexts.


Author(s):  
Lidiya V. Stezhenskaya ◽  
◽  

Autochthonous traditional Chinese thought in its most developed form could be found in the philosophy of Neo-Confucianism, which continues to be a sig­nificant factor in the modern national consciousness of the Chinese people. At the same time, the pre-emptive attention of Western Sinology and Russian Chinese studies to early Confucianism does not fully take into account the Neo-Confucian interpretation of the ancient Chinese classics. Russian and Western translations of the so-called Sixteen-Word Heart Admonition (Shi liu zi xin chuan), a passage from Chapter III “Da Yu mo” (Councel of Yu the Great) of the ancient Chinese classic The Book of Historical Documents (Shujing) by A. Gaubil, N.Ya. Bichurin, D.P. Sivillov, W.H. Medhurst, J. Legge, S. Couvreur, and W.G. Old demonstrate the gradual assimilation of its Neo-Confucian inter­pretation by Western and Russian translators. Archimandrite Daniil (Dmitry P. Sivillov), in his unpublished Russian translation of Shujing of the early 1840s, adopted this interpretation earlier and understood it better than the others. It is assumed that rejection of the Manchu language mediation and peruse of the con­temporary Neo-Confucian commentaries played the key role in his success. The importance of Neo-Confucian hermeneutics research for the studies of tradi­tional Chinese philosophy, including ancient Chinese classics, is emphasized. The text of the previously unpublished Shujing Chapter III Da Yu mo Russian transla­tion by archimandrite Daniil is attached.


Author(s):  
Robbie Duschinsky ◽  
Sarah Foster

The theory of mentalizing and epistemic trust introduced by Peter Fonagy and colleagues at the Anna Freud Centre has been an important perspective on mental health and illness. This book is the first comprehensive account and evaluation of this perspective. The book explores 20 primary concepts that organize the contributions of Fonagy and colleagues: adaptation, aggression, the alien self, culture, disorganized attachment, epistemic trust, hypermentalizing, reflective function, the p-factor, pretend mode, the primary unconscious, psychic equivalence, mental illness, mentalizing, mentalization-based therapy, non-mentalizing, the self, sexuality, the social environment, and teleological mode. The biographical and social context of the development of these ideas is examined. The book also specifies the current strengths and limitations of the theory of mentalizing and epistemic trust, with attention to the implications for both clinicians and researchers.


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