The Effect of Wrongful Conviction Rate on Death Penalty Support and How It Closes the Racial Gap

Author(s):  
Sishi Wu
Author(s):  
Marvin Zalman ◽  
Robert J. Norris

What is the rate of wrongful conviction? This question may be implicit in Blackstone’s ratio: “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” Scholarship designed to provide an empirical answer, however, emerged only with the rise of the “innocence movement” in the United States. This article does not provide another study estimating the rate of wrongful felony conviction either for a specified sample, such as death sentences within a specified time period, or for an entire jurisdiction. Instead, we evaluate the rate question itself and assess its importance to innocence scholarship and action. We first trace the question’s intellectual lineage, and its historical and ideological roots among innocence believers and innocence skeptics. We then describe and evaluate all or most of the published studies attempting to estimate the wrongful conviction rate. Next, we discuss a reoccurring limitation of this published work, namely, its failure to account for or its unsubstantiated assumptions about guilty pleas and misdemeanor convictions among innocent defendants. Finally, we question the continued importance of the rate question in light of the modern innocence movement and its growing accomplishments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 299-329
Author(s):  
Meera Rajah

The reversal of the burden of proof and the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain offences have left the Singapore criminal justice system the subject of much rights-based criticism. Case law hints that there exists a very real possibility of wrongful conviction, should the courts apply s. 107 of the Evidence Act (‘EA’) in its literal sense and shift the legal burden to the accused, irrespective of the defence he seeks to invoke. The Singapore courts have acknowledged that the ‘evidential burden’ of proof as a distinct legal concept on numerous occasions but have not reconciled it with Lord Devlin’s interpretation of s. 3(3) EA in Jayasena, which limits proof to the ‘legal burden’. This article argues that the time has come for the Singapore courts to expressly banish the Jayasena ghost. The fairer approach would be to examine whether the defence falls within the categories of (a) mental condition defences, namely insanity, insane automatism, diminished responsibility and intoxication causing abnormality of mind, and (b) other general defences. Reliance on a defence within the former category will cause the accused to bear the legal burden of proof; he should only bear the evidential burden for the latter.


1988 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-175
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated
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