THE ROLE OF THE DIVAN CLERKS AND POLITICAL LETTERS IN THE ‎DEVELOPMENT OF THE I. ABBASID PERIOD LITERATURE PROSE. AHMED BIN ‎YOUSSEF'S ALHAMIS RESSALA AS AN EXAMPLE‎

Divan Scribe is a very old profession and it is said that it was one of the highest and most ‎respected statures among worldly affairs, after the caliphate, when their positions in the state policy ‎and judicial affairs are taken into account. Most of the time, the profession of the Divan Scribe was ‎an important step to enter politics, as well as an important tool for reaching high positions such as ‎Vizier. In general, Divan Scribes had a special role serving the Arab culture during the Abbasid ‎period. Because the writing style of the Scribes had both lofty ideas and beautiful expression. As a ‎matter of fact, as required by their statures, these people developed a dual-character expression that ‎both emphasized the goals of the orders given from the administration and had the characteristics of ‎Arabic rhetoric in the literal sense of the word. Their language was not a dry administrative ‎language, on the contrary, it had brought together the requirements of the administrative language ‎and the artistic beauties of the word. This study sheds light on the relations of the Divan Scribes ‎with politics and the importance of this position during the Abbasid period. Again, in this study, the ‎connection of the art of scribe with the vizier and the contributions of the scribes in service to the ‎Arab-Islamic culture and especially in political thought are discussed despite the political crisis and ‎troubles faced by the scribes.‎

Urban Commoning: An Assessment of Its Aesthetic Dimension

The practice of urban commoning continues to tickle the imagination of activists and academics alike. Urban commoning’s aesthetic dimension, yet, has not been fully understood. This contribution seeks to fill such gap and approaches aesthetics in the literal sense: That which presents itself to sense perception. The article thus asks: To what extent may commoning practices that are dedicated to the disclosure of unheard voices (hence having an aesthetic dimension) shift urban power relations? This contribution takes its cue in Jacques Rancière’s theory of aesthetics and has the commoning experiment of Pension Almonde as its central case. Pension Almonde constituted a commons‐based, temporary occupation of a vacant social housing complex in Rotterdam, aimed specifically to undo the subordinate position of urban nomads and orphaned cultural initiatives. The article finally develops the distinction between a particular‐aesthetic dimension (making unheard voices merely perceptible) and a universal‐aesthetic dimension (shifting power relations) of urban commoning. Given the case’s lack of collective agency and external resonance, urban power relations remained in place.

WISDOM IN INVERTED COMMAS: GREEK COMEDY AND THE QUOTABLE MAXIM

Greek comedy is full of quotable maxims. According to a literal reading, the comedians might be seen as custodians of traditional gnomic wisdom, along with their tragic counterparts. Nevertheless, it is argued here that maxims in comedy are different from maxims in other contexts. Comic maxims typically appear ‘within inverted commas’, not just in a literal sense (because of their inherent ‘quotationality’) but in a figurative sense (because of their pervasive irony and self-consciousness). Examples from Menander, Antiphanes, Diphilus and others are used to demonstrate that the comedians can be seen as playing around with the content and form of traditional wisdom. Sometimes they seem to be poking fun at the maxim as a medium of expression, or at tragic maxims, or at the habit of quotation itself.

Struggles for Self-Determination

Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei and Bophuthatswana: four African countries that, though existing in a literal sense, were, in each case, considered by the international community to be a component part of a larger sovereign state through which all official communications and interactions were still conducted. This book is concerned with the intertwined histories of these four right-wing secessionist states in Southern Africa as they fought for but ultimately failed to win sovereign recognition. Along the way, Katanga, Rhodesia, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana each invented new national symbols and traditions, created all the trappings of independent statehood, and each proclaimed that their movements were legitimate expressions of national self-determination. Josiah Brownell provides a unique comparison between these states, viewed together as a common reaction to decolonization and the triumph of anticolonial African nationalism. Describing the ideological stakes of their struggles for sovereignty, Brownell explores the international political controversies that their drives for independence initiated inside and outside Africa. By combining their stories, this book draws out the relationships between the emergence of these four pseudo-states and the fragility of the entire postcolonial African state structure.

“I Have Been Born, Raised and Lived My Whole Life Here” – Perpetually on the Move While Remaining Still

This article explores the story of Einar, a Faroese man who always lived within a 500-meters radius on the island of Suðuroy, who never felt “stuck” or “immobile” in the literal sense of the word. Studies have shown that staying is a process, as much as mobility; yet while mobility studies mainly show that imagination is an incentive to move, we argue that imagination may also actively support staying. Combining sociocultural psychology with mobility studies, we propose to explore the entanglement of symbolic mobility (a form of imagination) and various forms of geographical (im)mobility. Based on ethnographic fieldwork and hours of conversation, we present the case study of Einar’s life on his island. We follow the sociogenetic development of the island, and the expansion and contraction of the imaginative horizon over time. On this background, we then retrace the life of Einar and show how, within this transforming context, his imagination developed thanks to resources he could use from the mobility of technologies, ideas, and other people. Interestingly, at different bifurcation points, his symbolic mobility almost led him to move away but, at another point, helped him to refuse geographical mobility. Hence, he was always symbolically mobile while staying. We finally propose directions for generalising from this case study, and implications for cultural psychology and for mobility and migration studies.

Dismantling the Chinese Room with linguistic tools: a framework for elucidating concept-application disputes

Imagine advanced computers that could, by virtue merely of being programmed in the right ways, act, react, communicate, and otherwise behave like humans. Might such computers be capable of understanding, thinking, believing, and the like? The framework developed in this paper for tackling challenging questions of concept application (in any realm of discourse) answers in the affirmative, contrary to Searle’s famous ‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, which purports to prove that ascribing such mental processes to computers like these would be necessarily incorrect. The paper begins by arguing that the core issue concerns language, specifically the discourse-community-guided mapping of phenomena onto linguistic categories. It then offers a model of how people adapt language to deal with novel states of affairs and thereby lend generality to their words, employing processes of assimilation, lexemic creation, and accommodation (in intersense and intrasense varieties). Attributions of understanding to some computers lie in the middle range on a spectrum of acceptability and are thus reasonable. Possible objections deriving from Searle’s writings require supplementing the model with distinctions between present and future acceptability, and between contemplated and uncontemplated word uses, as well as a literal-figurative distinction that is more sensitive than Searle’s to actual linguistic practice and the multiplicity of subsenses possible within a single literal sense. The paper then critiques two misleading rhetorical features of Searle’s Chinese Room presentation, and addresses a contemporary defense of Searle that seems to confront the sociolinguistic issue, but fails to allow for intrasense accommodation. It concludes with a brief consideration of the proper course for productive future discussion.

Representation of Different Types of Adjectival Polysemy in the Mental Lexicon

We studied mental representations of literal, metonymically different, and metaphorical senses in Russian adjectives. Previous studies suggested that in polysemous words, metonymic senses, being more sense-related, were stored together with literal senses, whereas more distant metaphorical senses had separate representations. We hypothesized that metonymy may be heterogeneous with respect to its mental storage. “Whole-part” metonymy (“sad person” – “sad eyes”), which is cognitively closer to the literal sense and more regular, should be stored differently from temporal, causal or resultative metonymy (“sad person” – “sad time;” “sad person” – “sad news;” “lead.ADJ ball” – “lead.ADJ poisoning”), which is irregular and semantically distant from the literal sense. We conducted an online experiment with semantic clustering task in which the participants were asked to classify sentences with a literal, proximal metonymic, distal metonymic, or metaphorical sense of an adjective into virtual baskets so that sentences with the same perceived sense were put in the same basket. Our results showed that proximal metonymies were grouped together with the literal sense and with each other more often than with distal metonymies and metaphors. Distal metonymies, in turn, were grouped with literal senses more often than with metaphors. Overall, we concluded that literal senses and proximal metonymies were stored in single representations, distal metonymies formed hybrid representations with literal senses, and metaphors were stored separately from literal senses. Additionally, we discovered that perception of semantic differences is affected by the surrounding senses: distal metonymies were more discernible from literal senses when presented with proximal metonymies, and less so when presented with metaphors.

Inhabiting Space

This chapter develops a philosophical picture of spatially embedded agency and perception, and argues that spaces and their dwellers mutually constitute one another. It lays out a philosophical framework and builds a philosophical toolbox for exploring cities and city living. It defends the strong philosophical claim that as spaces and dwellers make one another, they also generate ecological ontologies. In an ecological ontology, the kinds of real things that populate a particular environment are, in the most literal sense, to some extent constituted by the interactions between dwellers situated within that environment and between dwellers and their environment. The chapter ends by considering what makes a space ‘alive’ or ‘dead.’

Dao ist das Gegenteil Gottes

The term Dao originally means a Way or Course or Guide, something very close to purposive action as such – a prescribed course to attain a prescribed goal. It is precisely something that is selected out, valued, desired, kept to rather than discarded. The Daoist usage of the term “Dao” is thus an ironic usage: it is used deliberately in the opposite of its literal sense to make a point – the real way to attain value is through what we do not value, the real way is an anti-way, the real fulfilment of purpose lies in letting go of purpose. Purpose by definition excludes the purposeless. But this relationship is not symmetrical; purposelessness does not exclude purpose. On the contrary, it includes, allows, and even generates purpose. Not one purpose, however, but infinite purposes, all of which remain embedded in a larger purposelessness, but not contradicted or undermined by it. The structure of purpose is such as to either exclude or to subordinate the purposeless. But even if merely subordinated rather than excluded, purposelessness ceases tobe genuinely purposeless. It becomes instead instrumental to purpose, pervaded completely by purpose. So a monotheist cosmos is one that ultimately forecloses entirely purposelessness, and thereby also undermines all forms of inclusiveness, non-duality, and the non-personal. The relation of purpose to purposelessness is more tricky than it appears. This essay attempts a direct reconfiguring of this relation through the concept of wu-wei as effortless and purposeless action.