Novel one round message authentication scheme for constrained IoT devices

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan N. Noura ◽  
Ola Salman ◽  
Raphaël Couturier ◽  
Ali Chehab
Keyword(s):  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
Iot Devices

scholarly journals Lightweight identity authentication scheme for IoT devices based on blockchain

2021 ◽  
Vol 1812 (1) ◽  
pp. 012027
Author(s):  
Wanli Ma ◽  
Qi Zhang ◽  
Junwei Ma ◽  
Honglin Xue ◽  
Xiaowei Hao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Identity Authentication ◽  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
Iot Devices

Cryptanalysis of a Fragile Watermark Based H.264/AVC Video Authentication Scheme

2011 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 552-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace C.W. Ting ◽  
Bok Min Goi ◽  
S. W. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Hash Functions ◽  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Message Authentication ◽  
High Definition ◽  
Video Authentication ◽  
Fragile Watermark ◽  
Private Key ◽  
Watermark Embedding

H.264/AVC is a widespread standard for high definition video (HD) for example DVD and HD videos on the internet. To prevent unauthorized modifications, video authentication can be used. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of a H.264/AVC video authentication scheme proposed by Saadi et al. [1] at EUSIPCO 2009. Our result will prevent situations where newer schemes are developed from the scheme thus amplifying the flaw. The designers claimed that the scheme can detect modifications on watermarked video. However, we show that an attacker can modify the watermarked video and compute a valid watermark such that the recipient will retrieve a watermark from the modified watermarked video that will match what the recipient computes during video authentication check. Thus, the recipient will think the tampered video is authentic. The first main problem of the scheme is its use of hash functions for watermark generation. Since hash functions are public functions not depending on any secret, the attacker can modify the watermarked video and feed this through the hash function to compute a new watermark. The second problem is that it is possible for the attacker to perform watermark embedding thus producing a modified watermarked video. On receiving the modified video, the recipient recomputes the watermark and compares this with the watermark extracted from the video. They will match because the embedded watermark and recomputed watermark use the same hash function based watermark generation and the same input i.e. the modified video. Our cryptanalysis strategy applies to any watermarking based video authentication scheme where the watermark and embedding are not functions of secrets. As countermeasure, the functions should be designed so that only legitimate parties can perform them. We present two improved schemes that solve this problem based on private key signing functions and message authentication functions respectively.

Cryptanalysis of an Anonymous Message Authentication Scheme for Smart Grid

2020 ◽  
pp. 455-461
Author(s):  
Xiao-Cong Liang ◽  
Tsu-Yang Wu ◽  
Yu-Qi Lee ◽  
Tao Wang ◽  
Chien-Ming Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Smart Grid ◽  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
Message Authentication

Efficient approximate message authentication scheme

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-106
Author(s):  
Shaoquan Jiang ◽  
Jue Li ◽  
Yongjian Liao
Keyword(s):  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
Message Authentication
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