Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dolors Berga
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Generalized Median ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1080
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Panos Protopapas
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Generalized Median ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-peaked preferences over locations and ordinally extend their preferences over intervals. We extend the main results of Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) to our setting and show that the results of Ching (Soc Choice Welf 26:473–490, 1997) cannot always be similarly extended. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the class of generalized median correspondences (Theorem 1). Second, this result neither holds on the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences, nor can in this result min/max continuity substitute peaks-onliness (see counter-Example 3). Third, strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median correspondences (Theorem 2).

scholarly journals Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Jordi Massò ◽  
Alejandro Neme
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Generalized Median ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

Public Choice ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Marie Blin ◽  
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Jordi Massó
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Recognizing Top-Monotonic Preference Profiles in Polynomial Time

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 57-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Magiera ◽  
Piotr Faliszewski
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Polynomial Time Algorithm ◽  
Time Algorithm ◽  
Recognition Problem ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Weak Preference ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Preference Orders

We provide the first polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing if a profile of (possibly weak) preference orders is top-monotonic. Top-monotonicity is a generalization of the notions of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, defined by Barbera and Moreno. Top-monotonic profiles always have weak Condorcet winners and satisfy a variant of the median voter theorem. Our algorithm proceeds by reducing the recognition problem to the SAT-2CNF problem.

Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees

1993 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Faruk Gul ◽  
Ennio Stacchetti
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Generalized Median

scholarly journals On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Jordi Massó Carreras ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Private Goods ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness
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