Given an election, a preferred candidate
p
, and a budget, the S
HIFT
B
RIBERY
problem asks whether
p
can win the election after shifting
p
higher in some voters’ preference orders. Of course, shifting comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and one must not exceed the given budget. We study the (parameterized) computational complexity of S
HIFT
B
RIBERY
for multiwinner voting rules where winning the election means to be part of some winning committee. We focus on the well-established SNTV, Bloc,
k
-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We show that S
HIFT
B
RIBERY
tends to be harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where S
HIFT
B
RIBERY
is computationally easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones.