scholarly journals On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Jordi Massó Carreras ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Private Goods ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

Public Choice ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Marie Blin ◽  
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Jordi Massó
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

Public Choice ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Moulin
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

2020 ◽  
Vol 124 ◽  
pp. 219-238
Author(s):  
Agustín G. Bonifacio ◽  
Jordi Massó
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1080
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Panos Protopapas
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Generalized Median ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-peaked preferences over locations and ordinally extend their preferences over intervals. We extend the main results of Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) to our setting and show that the results of Ching (Soc Choice Welf 26:473–490, 1997) cannot always be similarly extended. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness characterize the class of generalized median correspondences (Theorem 1). Second, this result neither holds on the domain of symmetric and single-peaked preferences, nor can in this result min/max continuity substitute peaks-onliness (see counter-Example 3). Third, strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median correspondences (Theorem 2).

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
The Many ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

scholarly journals On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

2020 ◽  
Vol 186 ◽  
pp. 104992
Author(s):  
R. Pablo Arribillaga ◽  
Jordi Massó ◽  
Alejandro Neme
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordi Massó ◽  
Inés Moreno de Barreda
Keyword(s):  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Strategy Proofness
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