Analytic Basis of the Working of Monetary Policy in Less Developed Countries**Reprinted by permission of the IMF from Staff Papers, vol. xix, no. 3, pp. 533-58 (Nov. 1972).

Author(s):  
D.R. Khatkhate
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Felix S. Nyumuah

The linear specification of the ideal monetary policy reaction function has been questioned in recent times by researchers. They have suggested a nonlinear framework where central banks exhibit asymmetric behaviours. Despite the important policy implications of having asymmetric central bank preferences, studies have been on single-country basis focusing almost entirely on advanced economies. The aim of this study is to check the existence of asymmetric preferences on the part of central banks in the context of a panel of countries and not just a single a country. The study derives and estimates a nonlinear flexible optimal monetary policy rule, which permits zone-like as well as asymmetric behaviours using panel data from a range of countries both developed and less developed. Although the findings indicate the presence of asymmetric preferences on the output gap across less developed countries, generally, the evidence is in favour of a linear policy reaction function and symmetric central bank preferences. These findings mean that monetary policy is characterised by a linear policy rule and symmetric central bank preferences. The results also indicate that interest rate ‘smoothing’ reaction by monetary authorities is more pronounced in less developed countries than in developed ones.


1968 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward M. Bernstein

One would not ordinarily think of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as of particular importance to the less developed countries. Nevertheless, in recent years the less developed coun-tries have come to have a very high regard for the IMF; and the IMF, in turn, has become the great defender of the interests of the less developed countries. This entente has evolved out of the course of events. In the current discussions on international monetary reform the IMF has be-come the spokesman for universal participation in reserve creation. This suits the institutional interests of the IMF. At the same time it makes the IMF the advocate of the interests of the less developed countries


1987 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 767-774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faiz Bilquees

The application of IMF stabilization packages in the less developed countries (LDCs) has always been a controversial issue. The debate on IMF stabilization packages with their strong elements of conditionality and impact on the LDCs has intensified with the re-emergence of the payments imbalances in the Seventies and early Eighties. The objective of this paper is to evaluate, very briefly, Pakistan's three-year stabilization programme under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for the period 1980-83. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the IMF stabilization package under the standby arrangements and developments leading to the EFF arrangements. Section III provides a brief evaluation of the stabilization programmes. In Section N we attempt to evaluate Pakistan's programme in terms of quantifiable macro indicators as well as supply-side variables.


1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-88
Author(s):  
Maxwell J. Fry

The phenomenon of administrative controls designed to segment credit markets is not only widespread in less developed countries, but is prevalent in highly sophisticated forms in most Soviet-type economies.1 The rationale behind these controls lies in the fact that in planned or semi-planned economies investment programmes are prepared as disaggregated sectoral totals, usually broken down further by projects. Monetary policy can be of little assistance in realizing these sectoral plans, but some form of financial planning which relies on segmented credit markets is available for such a task. In particular, manipulation of the financial system by direct controls can be employed in order to direct funds into the planned investment projects and to prevent them from being used to finance unplanned investments. A common way of doing this is to set maximum interest rates below market equilibrium levels and then to ration credit on the basis of the planned priorities. Differential rediscount rates and other incentives can be used to encourage private financial insti¬tutions to lend in accordance with these planning objectives.


1984 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
WARREN L. COATS ◽  
DEENA R. KHATKHATE

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