An iterative uniform-price auction mechanism for peer-to-peer energy trading in a community microgrid

2021 ◽  
Vol 298 ◽  
pp. 117088
Author(s):  
Shuang Xu ◽  
Yong Zhao ◽  
Yuanzheng Li ◽  
Yue Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Price Auction

Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (06) ◽  
pp. 1750028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congjun Rao ◽  
Yong Zhao ◽  
Junjun Zheng ◽  
Mark Goh ◽  
Cheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Unique Equilibrium State

Multiple equilibria (equilibrium excursion) affects the auction proceeds, and is bad for estimating auction efficiency. This paper examines the relationship between bidding behavior and equilibrium excursion. We analyze a uniform price auction mechanism based on a rationing strategy and common value information. In this uniform price auction mechanism, bidders (strategic and non-strategic) participate in an auction simultaneously, and the auctioneer rations the strategic bidders after observing their bids. The conclusions drawn suggest that a rationing strategy can effectively limit the strategic bidders from manipulating the auction, and the Nash equilibrium may not be unique (i.e., there exists an equilibrium excursion). As the number of bidders increases, or when the quantity that can be allocated to the non-strategic bidders is unconstrained, there exists asymptotically a unique equilibrium price which is the highest price the auctioneer could obtain. Based on these conclusions, we provide some strategies and suggestions on how to induce the equilibrium excursion state to a desired unique equilibrium state.

scholarly journals Alternative Auction Institutions for Electric Power Markets

1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bernard ◽  
Timothy Mount ◽  
William Schulze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Electric Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Power Markets ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Electric Power Markets ◽  
Price Auction

Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market. This research uses experimental methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market power could be a real concern.

Tight Welfare Guarantees for Pure Nash Equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 1451-1469
Author(s):  
Georgios Birmpas ◽  
Evangelos Markakis ◽  
Orestis Telelis ◽  
Artem Tsikiridis
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Price Auction

scholarly journals UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS BASED ON MULTIPLE ROUNDS LINEAR BIDDING AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congjun RAO ◽  
Yong ZHAO ◽  
Yang CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Local Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Continuous Linear ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Goods

In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.

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