Aspiration-based co-evolution of cooperation with resource allocation on interdependent networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 135 ◽  
pp. 109769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengbin Sun ◽  
Chao Luo ◽  
Junqiu Li
2018 ◽  
Vol 510 ◽  
pp. 83-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng-Hong Deng ◽  
Yi-Jie Huang ◽  
Zhi-Yang Gu ◽  
Dan Liu ◽  
Li Gao

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaipeng Hu ◽  
Yewei Tao ◽  
Yongjuan Ma ◽  
Lei Shi

AbstractDespite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.


Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sayantan Nag Chowdhury ◽  
Srilena Kundu ◽  
Maja Duh ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Dibakar Ghosh

Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunpeng Du ◽  
Yini Geng ◽  
Xiaoxiao Yin ◽  
Yongjuan Ma ◽  
Xiaogang Li ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 151-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng-Hong Deng ◽  
Yi-Jie Huang ◽  
Zhi-Yang Gu ◽  
Dan Liu ◽  
Li Gao

2018 ◽  
Vol 508 ◽  
pp. 104-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Zhang ◽  
Wenbo Du ◽  
Wen Ying ◽  
Kaiquan Cai ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
...  

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