scholarly journals Cooperation on Interdependent Networks by Means of Migration and Stochastic Imitation

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sayantan Nag Chowdhury ◽  
Srilena Kundu ◽  
Maja Duh ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Dibakar Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Adverse Conditions ◽  
Interdependent Networks ◽  
Network Layers ◽  
Interdependent Network ◽  
Human Decision

Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.

RISK PREFERENCE AND SEQUENTIAL CHOICE IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 559-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICK ROOS ◽  
DANA NAU
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Value Maximization ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Descriptive Theories

There is much empirical evidence that human decision-making under risk does not coincide with expected value maximization, and much effort has been invested into the development of descriptive theories of human decision-making involving risk (e.g. Prospect Theory). An open question is how behavior corresponding to these descriptive models could have been learned or arisen evolutionarily, as the described behavior differs from expected value maximization. We believe that the answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the interplay between risk-taking, sequentiality of choice, and population dynamics in evolutionary environments. In this paper, we provide the results of several evolutionary game simulations designed to study the risk behavior of agents in evolutionary environments. These include several evolutionary lottery games where sequential decisions are made between risky and safe choices, and an evolutionary version of the well-known stag hunt game. Our results show how agents that are sometimes risk-prone and sometimes risk-averse can outperform agents that make decisions solely based on the maximization of the local expected values of the outcomes, and how this can facilitate the evolution of cooperation in situations where cooperation entails risk.

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 701-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
WEN-BO DU ◽  
XIAN-BIN CAO ◽  
HAO-RAN ZHENG ◽  
HONG ZHOU ◽  
MAO-BIN HU
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Multi Agent

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

scholarly journals Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaipeng Hu ◽  
Yewei Tao ◽  
Yongjuan Ma ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Random Network ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Small World ◽  
Peer Pressure ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interdependent Networks ◽  
Interdependent Network ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
Will Force ◽  
The Impact

AbstractDespite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

scholarly journals Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (172) ◽  
pp. 20200635
Author(s):  
Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero ◽  
Francisco C. Santos ◽  
Vito Trianni
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Game Theoretical Model

Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions among individuals. Signals and quorum dynamics may also drive cooperation. Here, we resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical model to jointly analyse these two mechanisms and study the conditions in which evolution selects for direct reciprocity, signalling, or their combination. We show that signalling alone leads to higher levels of cooperation than when combined with reciprocity, while offering additional robustness against errors. Specifically, successful strategies in the realm of direct reciprocity are often not selected in the presence of signalling, and memory of past interactions is only exploited opportunistically in the case of earlier coordination failure. Differently, signalling always evolves, even when costly. In the light of these results, it may be easier to understand why direct reciprocity has been observed only in a limited number of cases among non-humans, whereas signalling is widespread at all levels of complexity.

Book Reviews

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 942-944
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Worlds ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
University Of California ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Santa Cruz ◽  
Multiplicative Updates ◽  
The University ◽  
Washington University

John Nachbar of Washington University in St. Louis reviews “Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds,” by Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Primary or supplementary textbook for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in biology, economics, and engineering provides an introduction to evolutionary game theory (EGT) and shows how to take EGT models to the data, as well as presenting applications and explanations of EGT models from many fields. Includes end-of-chapter exercises. Discusses population dynamics; simple frequency dependence; dynamics in n-dimensional games; equilibrium; social games; cellular automaton games; rock–paper–scissors (RPS) everywhere—general RPS interactions in mating systems and Hadamard products; learning in games; contingent life cycle strategies; the blessing and the curse of the multiplicative updates (Manfred K. Warmuth); traffic games (John Musacchio); international trade and the environment (Matthew McGinty); the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. Friedman is Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Sinervo is Professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz.”

scholarly journals Research on evolutionary game of environmental accounting information disclosure from the perspective of multi-agent

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. e0256046
Author(s):  
Yi’ang Qi ◽  
Jingjing Yao ◽  
Lindong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Environmental Accounting ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Ecological Civilization ◽  
Green Development

In the past, China, like other developing countries in the world, pursued the goal of rapid economic development at the expense of ecology and ignored the issue of environmental protection. But in recent decades, as environmental problems have become increasingly prominent, developing countries have begun to explore ways to coordinate economy and ecological environment. As the largest developing country, China has been actively exploring ecological governance plans, putting forward the concept of green development, setting the goal of building a "beautiful China" and placing the construction of ecological civilization in the ontological status of social systems and national goals. In order to accelerate the green development process of enterprises in developing countries, based on the actual situation in China, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental accounting information disclosure with enterprises, investors and media as the research objects, and analyzes the internal mechanism of environmental accounting information disclosure. The model finds that the equilibrium of the three parties is affected by multiple factors. Therefore, this study further uses system dynamics to explore the dynamic process of evolutionary games and the strategic choices among multiple agents, and explore the mechanism of three types of agents to promote environmental accounting information disclosure. The simulation results reveal that government incentives have a greater impact on guiding enterprises and the media to evolve in the direction of legal disclosure and participation in exposure strategies. In addition, the continuous reduction of the cumbersome degree of disclosure procedures and the difficulty of improving environmental performance can fundamentally promote companies to actively choose legal disclosure strategies, which will help improve the quality of environmental accounting information disclosure, boost investor confidence, and enhance government supervision.

Role of Man in Production and Social Systems Based on Digital Technologies

2020 ◽  
pp. 6-13
Author(s):  
V. K. Potemkin
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Study ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Changing Role ◽  
Consistent Approach ◽  
Social Improvement

The article presents the results of a theoretical study of the influence processes of the developed digital technologies and the activities of enterprises and organizations on the changing role of man in labor and their social improvement. The necessity of a balanced and consistent approach to create conditions for the use of digital technologies in practical activities and determining the con- sequences not only in enterprises and organizations, but also in the conscious behavior and social realities of all workers, without exception, is substantiated. The main directions of the development of digital technologies are determined, involving the wide participation of workers in their use in enterprises and organizations.

scholarly journals Extended parenting and the evolution of cognition

2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1803) ◽  
pp. 20190495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Uomini ◽  
Joanna Fairlie ◽  
Russell D. Gray ◽  
Michael Griesser
Keyword(s):  
Life History ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Role Models ◽  
Brain Size ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cultural Learning

Traditional attempts to understand the evolution of human cognition compare humans with other primates. This research showed that relative brain size covaries with cognitive skills, while adaptations that buffer the developmental and energetic costs of large brains (e.g. allomaternal care), and ecological or social benefits of cognitive abilities, are critical for their evolution. To understand the drivers of cognitive adaptations, it is profitable to consider distant lineages with convergently evolved cognitions. Here, we examine the facilitators of cognitive evolution in corvid birds, where some species display cultural learning, with an emphasis on family life. We propose that extended parenting (protracted parent–offspring association) is pivotal in the evolution of cognition: it combines critical life-history, social and ecological conditions allowing for the development and maintenance of cognitive skillsets that confer fitness benefits to individuals. This novel hypothesis complements the extended childhood idea by considering the parents' role in juvenile development. Using phylogenetic comparative analyses, we show that corvids have larger body sizes, longer development times, extended parenting and larger relative brain sizes than other passerines. Case studies from two corvid species with different ecologies and social systems highlight the critical role of life-history features on juveniles’ cognitive development: extended parenting provides a safe haven, access to tolerant role models, reliable learning opportunities and food, resulting in higher survival. The benefits of extended juvenile learning periods, over evolutionary time, lead to selection for expanded cognitive skillsets. Similarly, in our ancestors, cooperative breeding and increased group sizes facilitated learning and teaching. Our analyses highlight the critical role of life-history, ecological and social factors that underlie both extended parenting and expanded cognitive skillsets. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.

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