scholarly journals On the long-term migration of uranyl in bentonite barrier for high-level radioactive waste repositories: The effect of different host rocks

2019 ◽  
Vol 525 ◽  
pp. 46-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyuan Cao ◽  
Liange Zheng ◽  
Deyi Hou ◽  
Litang Hu
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Wengler ◽  
Astrid Göbel ◽  
Eva-Maria Hoyer ◽  
Axel Liebscher ◽  
Sönke Reiche ◽  
...  

<p>According to the 'Act on the Organizational Restructuring in the Field of Radioactive Waste Disposal' the BGE was established in 2016. The amended 'Repository Site Selection Act' (StandAG) came into force in July 2017 and forms the base for the site selection by clearly defining the procedure. According to the StandAG the BGE implements the participative, science-based, transparent, self-questioning and learning procedure with the overarching aim to identify the site for a high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository in a deep geological formation with best possible safety conditions for a period of one million years.</p><p>The German site selection procedure consists of three phases, of which Phase 1 is divided into two steps. Starting with a blanc map of Germany, the BGE completed Step 1 in September 2020 and identified 90 individual sub-areas that provide favorable geological conditions for the safe disposal of HLW in the legally considered host rocks; rock salt, clay and crystalline rock. Based on the results of Step 1, the on-going Step 2 will narrow down these sub-areas to siting regions for surface exploration within Phase 2 (§ 14 StandAG). Central to the siting process are representative (Phase 1), evolved (Phase 2) and comprehensive (Phase 3) preliminary safety assessments according to § 27 StandAG.</p><p>The ordinances on 'Safety Requirements' and 'Preliminary Safety Assessments' for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste from October 2020 regulate the implementation of the preliminary safety assessments within the different phases of the siting process. Section 2 of the 'Safety Requirements' ordinance provides requirements to evaluate the long-term safety of the repository system; amongst others, it states that all potential effects that may affect the long-term safety of the repository system need to be systematically identified, described and evaluated as “expected” or “divergent” evolutions. Additionally, the ordinance on 'Preliminary Safety Assessments' states in § 7, amongst others, that the geoscientific long-term prediction is a tool to identify and to evaluate geogenic processes and to infer “expected” and “divergent” evolutions from those. Hence, considering the time period of one million years for the safe disposal of the HLW and the legal requirements, it is essential to include long-term climate evolution in the German site selection process to evaluate the impact of various climate-related scenarios on the safety of the whole repository system.</p><p>To better understand and evaluate the influence of climate-related processes on the long-term safety of a HLW repository, climate-related research will be a part of the BGE research agenda. Potential research needs may address i) processes occurring on glacial – interglacial timescales (e.g. the inception of the next glaciation, formation and depth of permafrost, glacial troughs, sub-glacial channels, sea-level rise, orbital forcing) and their future evolutions, ii) effects on the host rocks and the barrier system(s) as well as iii) the uncertainties related to these effects but also to general climate models and predictions.</p>


Geophysics ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (5) ◽  
pp. Q21-Q34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Marelli ◽  
Edgar Manukyan ◽  
Hansruedi Maurer ◽  
Stewart A. Greenhalgh ◽  
Alan G. Green

Countries worldwide are seeking solutions for the permanent removal of high-level radioactive waste from the environment. Surrounding the waste with multiple engineered barriers and emplacement in deep geological repositories is widely accepted as a safe means of isolating it from the biosphere for the necessary [Formula: see text]. As a precautionary measure, society demands that repositories be monitored for [Formula: see text] after they are backfilled and sealed. Effective monitoring that does not compromise the engineered and natural barriers is challenging. To address this issue, we investigate the viability of crosshole and hole-to-tunnel seismic methods for remotely monitoring high level radioactive waste repositories. Measurements are made at two underground rock laboratories in Switzerland, one within granitic rock and one within clay-rich sediments. Numerical simulations demonstrate that temporal changes of the monitored features (i.e., bentonite plug, excavation damage zone, sand-filled microtunnel) should produce significant changes in the seismicwaveforms. Nevertheless, inversion for medium-property changes requires that true seismic waveform changes are not overwhelmed by recording variations. We find that a P-wave sparker source is highly repeatable up to frequencies of [Formula: see text] for propagation distances out to tens of meters involved in repository-scale monitoring. Hydrophone repeatability is limited by incoherent high frequency noise and variable hydrophone-borehole coupling conditions, but firmly grouted geophones within the tunnels yield consistent recordings. Three kinds of coherent noise contaminate the data: (1) mechanically induced electrical effects in the hydrophone chains; (2) high currents in the sparker cable, which cause it to oscillate radially as a line source; and (3) tube waves. Our investigations outline a quantitative methodology to assess data-quality requirements for successful monitoring. We suggest that full waveform seismic tomography can be used to monitor radioactive waste emplacement tunnels, provided that careful attention is paid to instrument fidelity and noise suppression.


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