Quantity discount coordination for supply chains with deteriorating inventory

2021 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 106987
Author(s):  
Yeu-Shiang Huang ◽  
Jyh-Wen Ho ◽  
Hong-Jin Jian ◽  
Tzu-Liang (Bill) Tseng
2013 ◽  
Vol 655-657 ◽  
pp. 2348-2351
Author(s):  
Bai Xun Li ◽  
Qi Wei ◽  
Min Zhou

Applying competing newsvendor model, we studied the contract choice games between supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. We investigated the effect of the competition intensity on the equilibrium strategies of contract choice games. It can be found that, counter to the earlier literature, in the context of competing supply chains, the choices of quantity-discount contracts are the Nash equilibrium structure for both manufacturers, however, the manufacturers will get into classic prisoners’ dilemma if the degree of competition intensity is high.


2021 ◽  
Vol 122 ◽  
pp. 102888
Author(s):  
Han Zou ◽  
Maged M. Dessouky ◽  
Shichun Hu

2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (03/04) ◽  
pp. 60-61
Author(s):  
Jörg Schlüchtermann ◽  
Johannes Heller

Insbesondere in komplexen Supply Chains ist es heute üblich, dass Kunden ihre Lieferanten über Selbstverpflichtungserklärungen (Codes of Conduct) steuern. Forschungen aus anderen Industrien zeigen die Möglichkeiten, aber auch Grenzen der Arbeit mit diesem Instrument des Lieferantenmanagements. Davon können auch Krankenhauseinkäufer profitieren.


2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 634-641
Author(s):  
Hans Corsten ◽  
Ralf Gössinger
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (9) ◽  
pp. 535-539
Author(s):  
Rolf Krüger ◽  
Marion Steven
Keyword(s):  

Controlling ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 177-184
Author(s):  
Michael Eßig
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (8) ◽  
pp. 283-287
Author(s):  
Simone Guercini ◽  
◽  
Annalisa Tunisini

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