This paper studies a Cournot duopoly game in which firms produce homogeneous goods and adopt a bounded rationality rule for updating productions. The firms are characterized by an isoelastic demand that is derived from a simple quadratic utility function with linear total costs. The two competing firms in this game seek the optimal quantities of their production by maximizing their relative profits. The model describing the game’s evolution is a two-dimensional nonlinear discrete map and has only one equilibrium point, which is a Nash point. The stability of this point is discussed and it is found that it loses its stability by two different ways, through flip and Neimark–Sacker bifurcations. Because of the asymmetric structure of the map due to different parameters, we show by means of global analysis and numerical simulation that the nonlinear, noninvertible map describing the game’s evolution can give rise to many important coexisting stable attractors (multistability). Analytically, some investigations are performed and prove the existence of areas known in literature with lobes.