scholarly journals DomainChroma: Building actionable threat intelligence from malicious domain names

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 138-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daiki Chiba ◽  
Mitsuaki Akiyama ◽  
Takeshi Yagi ◽  
Kunio Hato ◽  
Tatsuya Mori ◽  
...  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tzung-Han Jeng ◽  
Yi-Ming Chen ◽  
Chien-Chih Chen ◽  
Chuan-Chiang Huang

Despite the efforts of information security experts, cybercrimes are still emerging at an alarming rate. Among the tools used by cybercriminals, malicious domains are indispensable and harm from the Internet has become a global problem. Malicious domains play an important role from SPAM and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) threats to Botnet and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks at large scales. To ensure there is not a single point of failure or to prevent their detection and blocking, malware authors have employed domain generation algorithms (DGAs) and domain-flux techniques to generate a large number of domain names for malicious servers. As a result, malicious servers are difficult to detect and remove. Furthermore, the clues of cybercrime are stored in network traffic logs, but analyzing long-term big network traffic data is a challenge. To adapt the technology of cybercrimes and automatically detect unknown malicious threats, we previously proposed a system called MD-Miner. To improve its efficiency and accuracy, we propose the MD-MinerP here, which generates more features with identification capabilities in the feature extraction stage. Moreover, MD-MinerP adapts interaction profiling bipartite graphs instead of annotated bipartite graphs. The experimental results show that MD-MinerP has better area under curve (AUC) results and found new malicious domains that could not be recognized by other threat intelligence systems. The MD-MinerP exhibits both scalability and applicability, which has been experimentally validated on actual enterprise network traffic.


Author(s):  
John Robertson ◽  
Ahmad Diab ◽  
Ericsson Marin ◽  
Eric Nunes ◽  
Vivin Paliath ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Nolan Arnold ◽  
Mohammadreza Ebrahimi ◽  
Ning Zhang ◽  
Ben Lazarine ◽  
Mark Patton ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Highnam ◽  
Domenic Puzio ◽  
Song Luo ◽  
Nicholas R. Jennings

AbstractBotnets and malware continue to avoid detection by static rule engines when using domain generation algorithms (DGAs) for callouts to unique, dynamically generated web addresses. Common DGA detection techniques fail to reliably detect DGA variants that combine random dictionary words to create domain names that closely mirror legitimate domains. To combat this, we created a novel hybrid neural network, Bilbo the “bagging” model, that analyses domains and scores the likelihood they are generated by such algorithms and therefore are potentially malicious. Bilbo is the first parallel usage of a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a long short-term memory (LSTM) network for DGA detection. Our unique architecture is found to be the most consistent in performance in terms of AUC, $$F_1$$ F 1 score, and accuracy when generalising across different dictionary DGA classification tasks compared to current state-of-the-art deep learning architectures. We validate using reverse-engineered dictionary DGA domains and detail our real-time implementation strategy for scoring real-world network logs within a large enterprise. In 4 h of actual network traffic, the model discovered at least five potential command-and-control networks that commercial vendor tools did not flag.


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