Evaluating the European Central Bank’s uncertainty forecasts

Author(s):  
Yoichi Tsuchiya
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Balibar

The problem of a European Constitution is discussed at a fundamental level. In which way, can we speak about such a Constitution? Thearticle argues against the “postnational souveranism”, legitimating state against citizens. A new kind of citizenship is favoured based on extended social rights. The constitution now proposed contrarily makes the European Central Bank and its neoliberal policy to central and nearly unchangeable institution.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

European governments, against their initial instincts, invited the International Monetary Fund to design financial rescue programs during the euro crisis in cooperation with the European Commission and European Central Bank. These institutions, known as the “troika,” constitute a regime complex in the parlance of international political economy. This book poses four questions about the regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area: Why did European governments choose this particular mix of institutions? What was the strategy of key member states in directing several institutions to collaborate on lending programs? Why did this arrangement endure despite severe conflicts among the institutions? Should the member states of the euro area “go it alone” by creating a European Monetary Fund? This chapter elaborates on these questions and provides an overview of the book.


Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter looks at the strong global economic recovery which took place in mid-2004, which accelerated world trade growth to historically high rates—a special advantage to European nations who all rely heavily for their economic well-being on international trade. With improved trade opportunities, even the struggling German economy began to show signs of life. The Eurozone, however, had economic and financial vulnerability. A source of instability inherent to monetary unity was vividly manifest during the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the early 1990s. A longer-term problem was the Eurozone's banks. Ultimately, the story of the next three years—between mid-2004 and mid-2007—revolves around a contest between the forces of “great moderation” and “irrational exuberance.” In the Eurozone, as member states benefited from an improving global economy, a belief in the European Central Bank's (ECB) distinctive ability to maintain stability reinforced the narrative of great moderation.


1964 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-425
Author(s):  
Donald Mead

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