scholarly journals Reactions of Euro Area Government Yields to Covid-19 Related Policy Measure Announcements by the European Commission and the European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
pp. 101917
Author(s):  
Ralf Fendel ◽  
Frederik Neugebauer ◽  
Lilli Zimmermann
Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (24) ◽  
pp. 40-53
Author(s):  
Pedro Miguel Alves Ribeiro Correia ◽  
◽  
Susana Antas Videira ◽  
Ireneu de Oliveira Mendes ◽  
◽  
...  

This article is the continuation of a series of studies on the impact of the measures implemented by the Portuguese Ministry of Justice. This research addresses the results obtained in the civil enforcement actions arising from objectives included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Portugal and the so-called Troika (International Monetary Fund / European Commission / European Central Bank). The empirical study was extended to cover the quantitative analysis of the results achieved not only during the Troika period but also during the post-Troika period. The results show and confirm a continued positive effect on the level of civil enforcement actions in the period analyzed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-138
Author(s):  
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré

The euro area crisis was less a crisis of the euro than a crisis of the Maastricht doctrine. The latter was based on a triple ban: no monetization of fiscal deficits, no bail-out, no sovereign default. The euro architecture was also based on a strict division of tasks: the European Central Bank would stabilize prices in the euro area as a whole, whereas national governments would stabilize their own economies in case of idiosyncratic shocks. To make things even more dysfunctional, bank supervision remained under the competence of the member states. Although much has been done since the crisis to reform the Maastricht framework, there are still major flaws that weaken the single currency.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (316) ◽  
Author(s):  

Since 2014, the CBBH has been exposed to a negative spread on the reinvestment of the reserve requirements. Until 2014, the CBBH remunerated reserve requirements on the basis of the returns achieved on their reinvestment in the euro area money market. In 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) cut the deposit facility rate below zero, the CBBH decided not to follow the ECB in the remuneration of reserve requirements and to floor such remuneration to zero. Subsequently, in 2016, the CBBH decided to remunerate excess reserves at 50 percent of the ECB deposit facility rate and to continue remunerating reserve requirements at 0 percent. This exposes the CBBH to a negative spread of about 0.25 percent and 0.45 percent between the reinvestment yield and the remuneration of excess reserves and reserve requirements, respectively.


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