Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

2012 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshihiro Matsumura
Keyword(s):  
Welfare Consequence ◽  
Asymmetric Regulation

Asymmetric Regulation and Incentives for Innovation

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS P. LYON ◽  
HAIZOU HUANG
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Regulation

Strategic Interaction under Asymmetric Regulation

2011 ◽  
pp. 22-47
Author(s):  
Bronwyn Howell
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Universal Service ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Contractual Agreements ◽  
Tariff Structures ◽  
Broadband Market ◽  
Telecommunications Market ◽  
Asymmetric Regulation

Regulation binds incumbent firms to a different set of obligations from their entrant-competitors, thereby creating an asymmetric set of options from which the firms may select the strategies under which they will interact. Whilst most regulatory obligations are specified in law, some take the form of contractual agreements. New Zealand’s ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations bind the telecommunications market incumbent to a set of retail tariff structures and levels that have both restricted its choices and opened up a range of new strategic opportunities for its rivals that have had a significant effect upon the development of the New Zealand industry. This paper examines the specific consequences of the asymmetric tariff obligations and ensuing strategic interaction amongst sector participants on sector development – namely the effect of universal service retail prices and the allocation of the ensuing costs in determining the ongoing regulatory agenda; the role of a ‘free local calling’ obligation on the evolution of New Zealand’s broadband market; and the consequent application of further asymmetric legislative obligations on the incumbent to address apparent ‘problems’ for which the asymmetric tariffs and rivals’ strategic choices provide more credible explanations than the incumbent’s exertion of its dominant position.

Asymmetric Networks and Access Charges

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Alexander Correa
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Entry ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Marginal Costs ◽  
Asymmetric Networks ◽  
Access Charges ◽  
Firm Asymmetry ◽  
Asymmetric Regulation

In order to suggest an appropriate regulatory regime in the context of firm asymmetry, this study has developed a mathematical model that allows to elucidate comparisons of three different regulatory scenarios. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to become dominant in the market. Symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which fall to the level of its marginal costs. Finally, asymmetric regulation is a highly effective way of promoting market entry. Asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare.

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