Stability and values for games with coalition structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 200 ◽  
pp. 109750
Author(s):  
Takaaki Abe
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-83
Author(s):  
Shaheen Fatima ◽  
Michael Wooldridge

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Takehiko Yamato

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Schaub ◽  
Florence Metz

To understand how actors make collective policy decisions, scholars use policy and discourse network approaches to analyze interdependencies among actors. While policy networks often build on survey data, discourse networks typically use media data to capture the beliefs or policy preferences shared by actors. One of the reasons for the variety of data sources is that discourse data can be more accessible to researchers than survey data (or vice versa). In order to make an informed decision on valid data sources, researchers need to understand how differences in data sources may affect results. As this remains largely unexplored, we analyze the differences and similarities between policy and discourse networks. We systematically compare policy networks with discourse networks in respect of the types of actors participating in them, the policy proposals actors advocate and their coalition structures. For the policy field of micropollutants in surface waters in Germany, we observe only small differences between the results obtained using the policy and discourse network approaches. We find that the discourse network approach particularly emphasizes certain actor types, i.e., expanders who seek to change the policy status quo. The policy network approach particularly reflects electoral interests, since preferences for policies targeting voters are less visible. Finally, different observation periods reveal some smaller differences in the coalition structures within the discourse network. Beyond these small differences, both approaches come to largely congruent results with regards to actor types, policy preferences and coalition structures. In our case, the use of discourse and policy network approaches lead to similar conclusions regarding the study of policy processes.


Author(s):  
Lise Storm

This chapter examines parties and party system change across the MENA countries since December 2010. The discussion begins with a brief overview of party systems in the region on the eve of the Arab Spring, thereby providing a quick introduction to the selected cases as well as a benchmark against which to measure change. Party system change is determined via indicators such as the effective number of parties, party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and the entry of new parties into the system. The analysis of the indicators of party system change is coupled with a discussion of empirical data on the political environment during and in the immediate aftermath of the elections, including issues such as regime classification, rotation of power, coalition structures, prohibited parties, and societal cleavages. The author explains how - despite the fact that some old regimes fell and elections were held - the traditionally dominant or hegemonic political parties stayed preeminent in a number of MENA countries. Finally, this chapter shows what party system change tells us about the prospects for democracy some five years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring.


Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Hagen ◽  
Pierre von Mouche ◽  
Hans-Peter Weikard

Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.


Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Trebbi ◽  
Eric Weese

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare impose enormous socio‐economic costs and often persist for decades. The opacity of such forms of conflict is an obstacle to effective international humanitarian intervention and development programs. To shed light on the internal organization of otherwise unknown insurgent groups, this paper proposes two methodologies for the detection of unobserved coalitions of militants in conflict areas. These approaches are based on daily geocoded incident‐level data on insurgent attacks. We provide applications to the Afghan conflict during the 2004–2009 period and to Pakistan during the 2008–2011 period, identifying systematically different coalition structures. Applications to global terrorism data and identification of new groups or shifting coalitions are discussed.


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