Zrínyi VII. Miklós részvétele a harmincéves háborúban (1642‒1644)

The estates of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom, as it is well known, took an active role in the struggles of the Thirty years’ War (1618‒1648) on the Habsburg dynasty’s side. At the request of the monarch, many aristocrats and wealthy noblemen, who had been trained in the so-called small wars (German Kleinkriege) practised along the Ottoman border, raised especially light cavalry units and conducted them to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire. Nicholas VII. Zrínyi/Zrinski (1620‒1664) the Croatian-Slavonian ban-to-be (1647–1664) himself recruited cavalry companies in three successive years (1642–1644), at the head of which he fought in Bohemia and Moravia against the Swedes as well as in upper Hungary against the troops of George I. Rákóczi, the Prince of Transylvania (1630–1648). Moreover, he was appointed as the supreme commander of the Croatian-type cavalry two times. The present gap-fi lling paper primarily aims to clear the chronology of Zrínyi’s field operations in these years. It also reveals his probable motives, the characteristics of the negotiations with the imperial high command as well as the gathering of the troops. The case study will enable us to draw conclusions about the military entrepreneurship of this kind, giving an impetus to the research of this neglected field of early modern military history.

Uniforms and Commercial Culture: Constructing a Vision of Warfare in Pre-Great War Britain

Uniforms carry cultural meaning shaped by their interaction with military realities. They can communicate tradition but also anticipate change. Prior to the Great War, British Army uniforms had developed from the familiar red tunic to khaki, but the manner of their representation in the mass culture confirmed a continuity and correctness of the British way of war that ran against the emerging industrialization of warfare. Wearing familiar uniforms linked to the past and concurrently fighting what seemed like anachronistic ‘small wars’ in empire as reported in the press, what awaited the volunteers of 1914–15 could not have been anticipated by those consumers of the commercial culture. This article uses a variety of sources, from the illustrated adult and juvenile press, paintings, and toys, to reveal the link between uniforms and the representation of warfare in the fifty years prior to the Great War. In that representation we see not just the glorification of war that cultural historians attach to gendered, imperialist, or nationalist meanings. This article argues that the role of uniforms in the representation of warfare was a means by which to make it knowable and worthwhile for the consumer public. But by representing past and contemporary uniforms quite accurately, the writers and artists imposed a sense of military continuity at a time when war was changing.

Drivers

This chapter explains the phenomenon as vicarious warfare confronts us today, and studies the multiple factors driving its modern adoption. It argues that vicarious warfare has come to dominate US strategic practice over the last decade, but in its contemporary form, it emerged out of developments apparent since at least the early 1990s, and in certain areas well before that. The chapter begins by considering some of the underlying factors that make proactive, forceful US intervention appear to policymakers as both essential and feasible. These should be understood as necessary but not sufficient factors because they do not necessarily preclude alternative military approaches more in line with the prescriptions of the other traditions of conventional battle or small wars. Why predominantly vicarious methods have come to the fore will become apparent as the chapter progresses to consider more specific and circumstantial factors associated with core sections of US society: namely, the military, the wider public and the media. The chapter concludes by bringing the analysis together to explain how, due to the confluence of developments in these various spheres, vicarious warfare emerges as an especially appealing solution for defence officials and political leaders facing multiple competing pressures and exigencies.

From Small Wars to Guerrilla Warfare: Imperial School of British Military Thought During the Interbellum

The Interbellum era was marked by the competition of various interpretations of guerrilla warfare and small wars, which were a practical expression of rebel activity in the colonies and on the outskirts of the British Empire. Discussions in that regard reflected both theoretical and doctrinal contradictions and the bureaucratic rivalry between the departments responsible for its internal security and the confrontation between the military and civilian authorities over the boundaries of their responsibility to preserve colonial order. The evolution of the meaning of the concept of “guerilla warfare” within the British military thought in the first half of the 20th century is demonstrated by highlighting the stages of the process, historical reconstruction of the levels of discussion of this topic in a professional environment, and identifying the degree of mutual influence of its basic provisions in the face of budgetary constraints and new challenges to colonial rule after the First World War. This approach allowed to specify ideas about the place and role of the army in the functioning of the internal security system of the British Empire at the final stage of its existence. The analysis of the semantics and content of the “guerilla warfare” concept between two world wars makes it possible to apply a new approach to the issue of disagreements between the military and civilian authorities over the choice of the military and political course in the conflicts of this kind. Thus, the identified differences may be viewed as a result not of the bureaucratic differences only, but as the absence of the unified understanding of the “modern rebellion” problem among the military as itself.

Battalion tactical groups of the Russian Armed Forces in the altered physiognomy of modern conflicts

The altered setting of current conflicts, its hybridity and nonlinearity affect the justification of the assumption that operations in several domains will become a new method of conducting operations of the Russian Armed Forces. The Russian Armed Forces battle groups are in practice known as battalion tactical groups (BTG). They have arisen in response to the problems regarding the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces units in local and small wars, and within the general transformation of the Russian Armed Forces, based on altered geopolitical and strategic circumstances. The basis of BTG consists of units from active brigades of the Russian Armed Forces, which are established modularly in accordance with the expressed needs and expected characteristics of operations. The first deployment of the Russian Armed Forces BTG was in the conflict in Ukraine, which has significantly improved their organization and deployment following the experiences from the mentioned conflict. The current deployment in the conflict in Syria greatly contributes to the maturing of the concept of BTG implementation in the expeditionary operations of the Russian Armed Forces. It can be expected that the Russian Armed Forces BTG will also play an increasingly important role in the future hotspots, in response to practical demands of modern hybrid wars.