Pricing decision of a manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information

2019 ◽  
Vol 278 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianheng Zhou ◽  
Ruijuan Zhao ◽  
Weishen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Pricing decision of a dual-channel supply chain with different payment, corporate social responsibility and service level

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Le Zhang ◽  
Lei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Payment Methods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Strategies such as price, CSR, and service have an important impact on enterprises and supply chains. This paper proposes a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the product pricing, CSR level, and service level in the supply chain, this paper employs the Stackelberg game to depict supply chain participants' optimal decisions and analyze the influence of explanatory variables on the optimal decision with retailer's payment methods. The results state that market share, service level, CSR, and financing interest rate significantly impact the pricing decision of all participants in the supply chain. In addition, strategies of CSR level and service level are also affected by the discount rate of advance payment, financing interest rate, return on investment, and opportunity cost rate. This paper incorporates CSR and service level into the objective function, considers a variety of retailers' payment methods, enriches the supply chain's pricing model, and is of great value to scientific decision-making of enterprises and sustainable development of supply chains.

scholarly journals Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debin Fang ◽  
Qiyu Ren
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Management ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Demand Model ◽  
Point Distribution ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

The growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfully or that demand satisfies a two-point distribution, which does not always conform to the reality of the dual-channel supply chain. Considering the potential information leakage problem, this paper studied the optimal strategies of the participants and focused on the strategic information management of the dual-channel supply chain. By introducing the retailers’ adverse selection behavior, a sequential game model under general uncertain demand was established, which replaced the classic high-low demand model. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was characterized, which depended on stochastic demand disturbance, product heterogeneity, supply chain structure, and market investigation cost. The results showed that asymmetric information made the supply chain management inefficient. When the demand disturbance was within the threshold, the retailer distorted order quantity to maintain the information advantage under potential information leakage, and information acquisition was not always good for the retailer—in some cases due to adverse selection problems. A numerical example and a sensitivity analysis were done to validate the model. Our work provides participants in the dual-channel supply chain with decision-making support and direction for improving information management.

scholarly journals Effect of Capital Constraint in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Capital constraint is a significant factor that mainly restricts the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises. This paper explores the channel strategy and pricing decision in a dual-channel supply chain, which consists of one supplier and one retailer. Adequate and inadequate capital constraints for the supplier are distinguished by determining whether open the retail channel to sell. The observations offer managerial insights into supply chain member. First, the results indicate that the capital constraint is a key factor affecting channel strategies and pricing decisions. With the increased value of capital constraint, the wholesale price of offline channel and the selling price of online channel firstly decrease and then remain constant. Second, the results demonstrate that, with capital constraint, the supplier pays more attention to consumers’ brand loyalty if it chooses to open the online channel only. Additionally, the price-sensitivity parameter has no effect on the strategy of opening only the offline channel. Moreover, when the channel competition is too intense, the supplier will choose to only open the online channel strategy and increase the online selling price if the capital is insufficient.

scholarly journals Pricing decision and coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chain dominated by a risk-aversion retailer under demand disruption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Zhuo Chen ◽  
Yanping Liu ◽  
Xiaoxu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Total Production ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier, and discusses the optimal decisions of supply chain participants under decentralized decision-making without and with demand disruption, respectively. By comparing the optimal decisions in the two scenarios, we find that the optimal decision after demand disruption is a linear function of the demand disruption plus optimal decision before demand disruption. Additionally, when the demand disruption is in interval , the optimal total production of the supply chain is equal before and after demand disruption. Moreover, the profits of the supply chain members and the value of their recognizing demand disruption are largely affected by the scale of demand disruption. Finally, the results show that the improved revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the supply chain performance.

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