scholarly journals Support for electoral system reform among voters and politicians: Studying information effects through survey experiments

2021 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 102313
Author(s):  
Sveinung Arnesen ◽  
Johannes Bergh ◽  
Dag Arne Christensen ◽  
Bernt Aardal
2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Göbel

In 2004, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) was abolished in Taiwan. The SNTV had long been seen as a major factor in the sustenance of county- and township-level clientelist networks (“local factions”). It was also associated with phenomena such as extremism, candidate-centred politics, vote-buying, clientelism and organized crime involvement in politics. More recent scholarship, however, has led to doubts that a single formal institution like an electoral system could have such a powerful influence on electoral mobilization. This article puts these positions to an initial test. It examines the impact of the electoral reform on the mobilization capacity of a local faction in a rural county notorious for its factionalism. By illuminating its intricate mobilization structures, it provides support for the second position: These structures are too resilient to be affected by even a radical electoral reform.


Author(s):  
Steven K. Vogel

In the postwar era, Japan benefited from an unusually competent, public-minded, and powerful central bureaucracy that contributed to rapid economic growth, high education and health standards, domestic stability, and peaceful international relations. The regime combined democratic politics with strong administrative capacity and partial insulation from interest group pressures. Central ministry officials developed a compromise between autonomy and inclusion whereby they played a distinctively political role of arranging bargains among key interest groups. Yet the bureaucracy’s power and insulation also restricted the participation of civic groups and minority interests in the policy process, limited accountability to the broader public, and fostered collusive partnerships with politicians and favored interest groups. Bureaucratic dominance began to wane in the 1970s as politicians pushed beyond Ministry of Finance budget limits to expand the welfare state and boost public works spending for their constituents. Bureaucrats confronted even greater challenges in the 1990s, including a devastating financial crisis that abruptly ended the high-growth period, an electoral system reform that transformed political dynamics, and a gradual erosion of prestige. Meanwhile, political leaders enacted administrative reforms to strengthen their control over the bureaucracy and to centralize power in the Prime Minister’s Office and the cabinet. Nevertheless, Japan’s elite civil servants have preserved some core powers, including control over substantial elements of the policy process, the capacity to forge political bargains, and a knack for manipulating politicians to pursue their own policy preferences.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110438
Author(s):  
William O’Brochta ◽  
Patrick Cunha Silva

The international community invests heavily in democracy promotion, but these efforts sometimes embolden leaders not interested in true democratic reform. We develop and test a formal model explaining why this occurs in the context of electoral system reform—one of the most important signals of democratic quality. Our formal model characterizes leaders as either truly reform minded or pseudo-reformers, those who increase electoral system proportionality in order to receive international community benefits while engaging in electoral fraud. We hypothesize that the international community will be more (less) likely to detect fraud when leaders decrease (increase) proportionality, regardless of whether there is evidence of numerical fraud. Using a mixed-methods approach with cross-national and case study data from post-Communist states, we find that the international community is generally less likely to detect fraud following an increase in proportionality and vice versa. We suggest that democracy promoters over-reward perceived democratic progress such that pseudo-reformers often benefit.


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