Digital vote-buying will challenge weak democracies

Significance In August, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) warned that online banking and electronic wallets -- the use of which has surged during the pandemic -- will be prime vehicles for digital vote-buying. Impacts Digital vote-buying will strengthen regional political clans, which are often the conduit for vote-buying in rural areas. Foreign influencer campaigns could become more disruptive with digital vote-buying. Fintech firms in fragile democracies could face tighter regulation on transparency and Know Your Customer rules.

Pathways of Electoral Clientelism in University Student Elections in Ghana: An Exploratory Study

Recent studies on student politics and governance have shown that electoral clientelism (EC) in university student elections is often facilitated by clientelist relations between student leaders and political parties. However, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating the various forms of electoral clientelism, as manifested through vote-buying practices in campus electoral politics in African universities. This article, therefore, investigates the multifaceted and changing dynamics of vote-buying in student electoral processes in Ghanaian universities. The study adopted a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews with 15 student leaders, 4 university staff working with student leadership, and 4 focus group interviews involving students at the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. From our finding, we argue that electoral clientelism takes place in five crucial ways in university student elections in Ghana. These include the provision of direct cash payments, exchanging electoral support for student government positions and appointments, provision of food and beverage consumables, award of student-related business contracts, and provision of educational materials and souvenirs.

Reproducing Populism

This chapter discusses the third mechanism populist presidents use to reproduce their power: the tilting of the electoral playing field. The chapter shows the centrality of free and fair elections in defining democracy. It then identifies and discusses the main characteristics of democratic elections. The remainder of the chapter shows how unconstrained populist presidents violate four central conditions of free and fair elections: the free formation of alternatives, the free formation of preferences, the freedom to express these preferences, and the neutral management of elections. The chapter argues that the illegal enabling of reelection and the elimination of term limits violate the free formation of alternatives; the restriction of political and civil liberties and unfair access to media undermine the free formation of preferences; voter intimidations and vote buying violate the freedom to express those preferences; and electoral fraud and institutional biases negate the neutral management of elections.

Gendered Pathways to the County-level People's Congress in China

Women are underrepresented in legislature almost worldwide, and China is no exception. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented its first gender quota in 1933, gender quotas and women's representation in China remain understudied. This study fills the literature gap by examining the subnational variation in gender quota implementation and women's representation in the county-level people's congresses (CPC). Through a comparison of four county-level units in Hunan and Hubei with similar socioeconomic features yet contrasting results in the numbers of female representatives elected in the 2016 CPC election, this study argues that women's access to CPCs is affected by the CCP's adoption and enforcement of grassroots quotas. The fieldwork shows that although all cases introduced a 30 per cent gender quota, only CPCs in Hunan province were able to meet the quota requirements. This was because the grassroots quota threshold was raised in Hunan and strictly enforced, partly as a response to the 2013 Hengyang vote-buying scandal. In contrast, CPCs in Hubei province nominated a large number of “first hands” (yibashou) candidates, very few of whom were women.

Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE DILEMMA OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

For any Democracy to thrive, the onus lies significantly on the activities and strength of political parties. It is framework as per- analyzing the efficacy and efficiency of democracy in both the developed and developing countries. However, it is a different kettle of fish in Nigeria as our political parties are characterized by primordial and gender chauvinistic tendencies, inadequate ideology, inadequate mechanism and ethnic sentiments. Information is mainly sourced from existing literature and among other sources. This paper adopts the structural functionalist theory as a method of analyzing the political system in the country. Modern challenges of democracy in the country were highlighted, such as: ethnicism, inadequate political institution, poor internal democratic culture, electoral misconduct (vote buying, etc.), gender inequality, religious diversity, among others. Measures on how best to sustain the country’s democracy are strengthening democratic institutions, shunning: ethno-religious sentiment; electoral misconduct of any magnitude; among others.

Multilayered Oversight: Electoral Administration in Indonesia

Electoral administration in Indonesia is complex. The Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) is responsible for planning and running five-yearly elections for one national and two regional legislatures, and one additional national regional representative body, as well as direct presidential, gubernatorial, mayoral and regent elections. Because candidates and parties often have significant financial stakes in their outcome, these elections are hotly contested and the results quite commonly disputed, including in Indonesia's Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). Electoral contestants often point to mistakes in administration and vote counting, which appear to be natural consequences of the great logistical challenges these elections present. For example, on 17 April, 2019, well over 150 million citizens attended one of over 800,000 polling stations to vote for candidates to fill 19,817 legislative seats in national and subnational parliaments. Many of these elections are said to be marred by attempts by candidates and their parties to gain illegal advantage, whether through misuse of incumbency or vote buying. There is also said to be much potential for corruption amongst electoral administrators themselves in registering candidates, verifying parties, procuring equipment for polling stations, and counting and tallying votes on election day. Given the potential of mistakes and illegality to jeopardise the legitimacy of election results, lawmakers in Indonesia have created multi-layered oversight mechanisms to oversee the planning and running of the elections by the Electoral Commission, as well as to oversee the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum) itself, which is charged with supervising that Commission. This article examines the work and performance of these institutions, and the Electoral Administration Honour Council (DKPP, or Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu), which hears allegations of breaches by the Commission and the Board.

Stigmatized Campaign Practices and the Gendered Dynamics of Electoral Viability

What happens when a traditional source of political capital becomes a health hazard? Stigmatized electoral practices, such as vote buying, are a double-edged sword: While these strategies may signal candidates’ electoral strength, they may also entail reputational costs. In normal times, street campaigns are a non-stigmatized electoral practice. During the Covid-19 pandemic, however, they imposed health risks. Employing data from a national survey experiment conducted in Brazil prior to the 2020 municipal elections ( N = 2025), we extend research on the employment of stigmatized campaigns and the gendered dynamics of electoral viability. We find that voters evaluate candidates who engage in face-to-face activities as less electorally viable and report lower intent to support them. These dynamics do not impact all candidates equally: Voters more harshly punish women candidates who conduct street campaigns than men, leading women to lose the advantage they have over men when both employ non-stigmatized campaign practices.