Risk governance and Asian bank performance: An empirical investigation over the financial crisis

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 53-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Battaglia ◽  
Angela Gallo
2021 ◽  
pp. 097491012110311
Author(s):  
Salma Zaiane ◽  
Fatma Ben Moussa

The purpose of the study is to identify bank specific, macroeconomic, and stability determinants of both conventional and Islamic bank performance. We also try to identify evidence on the impact of financial crisis and political instability during the Arab Spring (AS) period. The study covers a sample of 123 banks (34 Islamic banks and 89 conventional banks from 13 Middle East and North Africa [MENA] countries) over the period 2000–2013. We use different proxies of performance as dependent variables: return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net income margin (NIM), and estimate several regressions using the dynamic generalized method of moments. Our results reveal that bank size, asset quality, specialization, and diversification are the major bank specific factors affecting performance of Islamic and conventional banks. Besides, macroeconomic indicators (GDP and inflation) and regulatory quality influence both types of banks differently. Finally, both the financial crisis and political instability negatively affect bank performance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN GLENN

AbstractThis article examines the financial reforms that have been undertaken through two perspectives on risk: that of Beck's world risk society and an alternative Foucauldian approach. The former argues that, catastrophes such as the recent financial crisis will induce a political shift towards a cosmopolitan form of statehood. Yet, the lack of radical reform since the financial crisis would suggest otherwise. The article therefore argues that what we are witnessing is best understood in terms of reflexive governance in which the various rationalities of risk are reassessed and strengthened in order to avoid a similar occurrence in the future. Moreover, in response to the uncertainty that surrounds such rare events, more intense forms of surveillance have been adopted with the objective of pre-empting any future crisis. Yet, for various reasons, the reforms remain rather limited and the new rationality of pre-emption is unlikely to prevent further crises from occurring in the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-304
Author(s):  
M. Pilar García-Alcober ◽  
Diego Prior ◽  
Emili Tortosa-Ausina ◽  
Manuel Illueca

After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some bank performance dimensions have been the subject of debate, two of which are bank efficiency and bank risk-taking behavior. The literature on bank efficiency and productivity has grown considerably over the past three decades, and has gained momentum in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Interest in bank risk-taking behavior, usually focusing on its links to monetary policy, has been relatively low, but has also increased exponentially in more recent years. This article combines these two streams of research. Specifically, we test whether more inefficient banks take greater risks when selecting borrowers, charging interests, and requiring collateral, and whether these links between inefficiency and risk change according to the type of bank. Our analysis centers on the Spanish banking system, which has been severely affected by the burst of the housing bubble and has undergone substantial restructuring. To test our hypotheses, we created a database with information on banks and savings banks, their borrowers (non-financial firms), and the links between them. The study also contributes to the literature by considering a novel profit frontier approach. Our results suggest that more inefficient banks take greater risks in selecting their borrowers, and that this high-taking behavior is not offset by higher interest rates. JEL CLASSIFICATION C14; C61; G21; L50


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