The global financial crisis hit hard in the euro area, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Real GDP from peak to trough contracted by about 6 percent in the euro area and the United Kingdom and by 9 percent in Japan. In all three cases, central banks cut interest rates aggressively and then, as policy rates approached zero, deployed a variety of untested and unconventional monetary policies. In doing so, they hoped to restore the functioning of financial markets, and also to provide further monetary policy accommodation once the policy rate reached the zero lower bound. In all three jurisdictions, the strategy entailed generous liquidity support for banks and other financial intermediaries and large-scale purchases of public (and in some cases private) assets. As a result, central banks’ balance sheets expanded to unprecedented levels. This paper examines the experience with unconventional monetary policies in the euro zone, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The paper starts with a discussion of how quantitative easing, forward guidance, and negative interest rate policies work in theory, and some of their potential side effects. It then reviews the implementation of unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan, including a narrative of how central banks responded to the crisis and the evidence on the effects of unconventional monetary policy actions.
Negative interest rates, excess liquidity and retail deposits: Banks’ reaction to unconventional monetary policy in the euro area
