scholarly journals Financial “risk-sharing” or refund programs in assisted reproduction: an Ethics Committee opinion

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. e8-e11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Daar ◽  
Jean Benward ◽  
Lee Collins ◽  
Joseph Davis ◽  
Leslie Francis ◽  
...  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 238146832199040
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Zaric

Background. Pharmaceutical risk sharing agreements (RSAs) are commonly used to manage uncertainties in costs and/or clinical benefits when new drugs are added to a formulary. However, existing mathematical models of RSAs ignore the impact of RSAs on clinical and financial risk. Methods. We develop a model in which the number of patients, total drug consumption per patient, and incremental health benefits per patient are uncertain at the time of the introduction of a new drug. We use the model to evaluate the impact of six common RSAs on total drug costs and total net monetary benefit (NMB). Results. We show that, relative to not having an RSA in place, each RSA reduces expected total drug costs and increases expected total NMB. Each RSA also improves two measures of risk by reducing the probability that total drug costs exceed any threshold and reducing the probability of obtaining negative NMB. However, the effects on variance in both NMB and total drug costs are mixed. In some cases, relative to not having an RSA in place, implementing an RSA can increase variability in total drug costs or total NMB. We also show that, for some RSAs, when their parameters are adjusted so that they have the same impact on expected total drug cost, they can be rank-ordered in terms of their impact on variance in drug costs. Conclusions. Although all RSAs reduce expected total drug costs and increase expected total NMB, some RSAs may actually have the undesirable effect of increasing risk. Payers and formulary managers should be aware of these mean-variance tradeoffs and the potentially unintended results of RSAs when designing and negotiating RSAs.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Li ◽  
Guanghao Jin ◽  
Shen Duan

This paper focuses on the game evolution process and its influencing factors of financial risk cooperation behavior between suppliers and manufacturers in global supply chain system. Using two-population evolutionary game theory, the performance of supply chain members under financial risk environment is modeled. Further, the proposed financial risk game model is applied to simulation cases of global supply chain. Based on the theory analysis and simulation results, it is shown that the cooperation strategy is the optimal evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for all supply chain members, when facing the high financial risk. The financial risk-sharing coefficient can be regarded as an adjuster that affects risk ESS of both suppliers and manufacturers under the low financial risk setting. By reducing the financial risk-sharing ratio of one supply chain player, his intention of adopting cooperation strategy would be enhanced. Finally, it is observed that financial risk sharing approach may lead to the alignment among supply chain members. Therefore, setting up an effective financial risk-sharing mechanism is beneficial to realize sustainable development of global supply chain.


Author(s):  
Stephany Griffith-Jones ◽  
Natalya Naqvi

This chapter focuses on the European Investment Bank and the Juncker Plan in terms of its impact on industrial policy and state-market relations. Showing the growth of both the EIB and the EIF over the past two decades, the chapter highlights the increasing importance of engaging private investors in their financial operations. By proposing an analytical distinction between “economic” and “financial” risk, it argues that operating on risk-sharing arrangements has led the EIB—and the Juncker Plan—to effectively accumulate the latter at the expense of the former, which has resulted not only in a trade-off between actual policy steer as envisaged by the Commission and increased leverage as a developmental strategy, but also in political tensions within the field of development banking.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-767
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Davidson ◽  
Larry M. Manheim ◽  
Mina M. Hohlen ◽  
Stephen M. Werner ◽  
Beth K. Yudkowsky ◽  
...  

This paper is a report of the results of a demonstration designed to provide empirical evidence regarding the effects of alternative approaches to paying physicians for serving children in the Medicaid program: (1) visit fees set at twice regular Medicaid fees in return for physician agreement to manage utilization and (2) capitation and financial risk-sharing along with the same physician agreement to manage utilization. Participating physicians were assigned randomly to either of the two payment groups. Comparisons of utilization and expenditures were made between these two plans and the regular Medicaid program(fee-for-service, low fees). Results showed no adverse effect of capitation payments on primary care visits to office-based physicians. Capitation physician referrals to specialists decreased relative to all other groups studied, consistent with the theory that the financial incentives in capitation will lead primary care physicians to reduce referrals to specialists.


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