scholarly journals A fascinating but risky case of reverse inference: From measures to emotions!

2021 ◽  
pp. 104183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Delplanque ◽  
David Sander
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 834-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Moran ◽  
Jamil Zaki

Functional imaging has become a primary tool in the study of human psychology but is not without its detractors. Although cognitive neuroscientists have made great strides in understanding the neural instantiation of countless cognitive processes, commentators have sometimes argued that functional imaging provides little or no utility for psychologists. And indeed, myriad studies over the last quarter century have employed the technique of brain mapping—identifying the neural correlates of various psychological phenomena—in ways that bear minimally on psychological theory. How can brain mapping be made more relevant to behavioral scientists broadly? Here, we describe three trends that increase precisely this relevance: (i) the use of neuroimaging data to adjudicate between competing psychological theories through forward inference, (ii) isolating neural markers of information processing steps to better understand complex tasks and psychological phenomena through probabilistic reverse inference, and (iii) using brain activity to predict subsequent behavior. Critically, these new approaches build on the extensive tradition of brain mapping, suggesting that efforts in this area—although not initially maximally relevant to psychology—can indeed be used in ways that constrain and advance psychological theory.


Brain Mapping ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 647-650
Author(s):  
R.A. Poldrack
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (15) ◽  
pp. 4155-4172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franco Cauda ◽  
Andrea Nani ◽  
Donato Liloia ◽  
Jordi Manuello ◽  
Enrico Premi ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
pp. 108-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim I. Krueger
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Jonathan A. Fugelsang ◽  
Derek J. Koehler ◽  
Valerie A. Thompson

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Bianca Jarecki ◽  
Jolene Tan ◽  
Mirjam Jenny

The term process model is widely used but rarely agreed upon. This paper proposes a framework for characterizing and building cognitive process models. Process models model not only inputs and outputs but also model the ongoing information transformations at a given level of abstraction. We argue that four dimensions characterize process models: They specify intermediate stages containing the hypothesized mental information processing. They make predictions not only for the behavior of interest but also for process-related variables. Third, the models’ process predictions can be derived from the input without reverse inference from the output data. Fourth, the presumed information transformation steps are not contradicting current knowledge of human cognitive capacities. Finally, process models require a conceptual scope specifying what the model refers to, that is, the information entering the mind, the proposed mental events, and the behavior of interest. This framework can be used for refining models before testing them or after testing them empirically, and it does not rely on specific modeling paradigms. It can be a guideline for developing cognitive process models. Moreover, the framework can advance currently unresolved debates about which models belong to the category of process models.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1218-1229
Author(s):  
Jana B. Jarecki ◽  
Jolene H. Tan ◽  
Mirjam A. Jenny

AbstractThe term process model is widely used, but rarely agreed upon. This paper proposes a framework for characterizing and building cognitive process models. Process models model not only inputs and outputs but also model the ongoing information transformations at a given level of abstraction. We argue that the following dimensions characterize process models: They have a scope that includes different levels of abstraction. They specify a hypothesized mental information transformation. They make predictions not only for the behavior of interest but also for processes. The models’ predictions for the processes can be derived from the input, without reverse inference from the output data. Moreover, the presumed information transformation steps are not contradicting current knowledge of human cognitive capacities. Lastly, process models require a conceptual scope specifying levels of abstraction for the information entering the mind, the proposed mental events, and the behavior of interest. This framework can be used for refining models before testing them or after testing them empirically, and it does not rely on specific modeling paradigms. It can be a guideline for developing cognitive process models. Moreover, the framework can advance currently unresolved debates about which models belong to the category of process models.


Author(s):  
Beatriz Santos-Buitrago ◽  
Adrián Riesco ◽  
Merrill Knapp ◽  
Gustavo  Santos-García ◽  
Carolyn Talcott

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  

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