scholarly journals Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 329-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Xue Li ◽  
Burkhard C. Schipper
1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Reynolds

These three books cover the gamut of argument about deterrence, ranging from its politics to its theoretical status and its morality. The authors, while diverse in their professional status, being government 'experts', lawyers, theologians, political scientists and philosophers, all have this in common: they seek to tell us what to do. They attempt to relate theory to practice either to justify instrumental means or goals or to prescribe them. In this sense they are all contributors to the field of strategic reasoning.


Futures ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.Bradley MacKay ◽  
Peter McKiernan
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Merlone ◽  
Angelo Romano

Background. COMMUTER BRIDGE is a n-person social dilemma game that allows participants to experience situations in which individual rationality leads to collective disaster. Aim. Participants are asked to imagine they are commuters who must every day reach a place in the shortest possible time. Method. The game is divided in two phases: in the first phase, participants can choose between two routes whereas in the second phase they are given a third possibility by the construction of a bridge that, paradoxically, increases traffic. Results and conclusion. Participating in this activity will enhance understanding of social dilemmas, help discover the limitations of communications, and develop insights about personal fallacies in strategic reasoning.


Author(s):  
Mark Hoogendoorn ◽  
Catholijn M. Jonker ◽  
Peter-Paul van Maanen ◽  
Jan Treur

Author(s):  
Mark Hoogendoorn ◽  
Catholijn M. Jonker ◽  
Peter-Paul van Maanen ◽  
Jan Treur

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