Reasoning About Agents That May Know Other Agents’ Strategies

We study the semantics of knowledge in strategic reasoning. Most existing works either implicitly assume that agents do not know one another’s strategies, or that all strategies are known to all; and some works present inconsistent mixes of both features. We put forward a novel semantics for Strategy Logic with Knowledge that cleanly models whose strategies each agent knows. We study how adopting this semantics impacts agents’ knowledge and strategic ability, as well as the complexity of the model-checking problem.

Reflectivity relates differently to pro sociality in naïve and strategic subjects

Is pro sociality a natural impulse or the result of a self-controlled behavior? We investigate this issue in a lab in the field experiment with participants from the general adult population in Italy. We find two key results: first, that there is a positive relationship between pro sociality and strategic reasoning. Second, that reflectivity relates to lower pro sociality but only among strategic subjects, indicating that the intuitive view of pro sociality is valid only among strategic individuals. Non-strategic individuals are instead intuitively selfish. We surmise that these results emerge due to a common cognitive root between strategizing and pro sociality, namely empathy.

084 Does Alignment between the Timing of Sleep and Circadian Rhythm Predict Behavioral Decision Making?

Introduction Cognitive performance and decision making have been shown to suffer under conditions of misalignment between circadian preference and time-of-assessment; however, little is known about how misalignment between the timing of sleep and circadian rhythm impacts decision making. To this end, this study captured naturally occurring degrees of alignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm (i.e., alignment of sleep-wake timing with circadian phase) to examine if greater misalignment predicts worse behavioral decision making. Methods Over the course of two weeks, 32 participants (18–22 years of age; 61% female; 69% White) continuously wore actigraphs and completed two overnight in-lab visits (Thursday and Sunday) in which both dim light melatonin onset (DLMO) and behavioral decision-making (risk taking, framing, and strategic reasoning tasks) were assessed. Sleep-wake timing was assessed by actigraphic midsleep from the two nights prior to each in-lab visit. Alignment was operationalized as the interval between DLMO and average midsleep. Multilevel modeling was used to predict performance on decision making tasks from circadian alignment during each in-lab visit; nonlinear associations were also examined. Results Misalignment characterized by shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted decision-making in a curvilinear fashion (i.e., squared misalignment term predicted performance). Specifically, shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted greater risk-taking under conditions of potential loss (B = .10, p = .04), but less risk-taking under conditions of potential reward (B = -.14, p = .04) in a curvilinear fashion. Misalignment did not predict decision-making in the framing and strategic reasoning tasks. Conclusion Findings suggest that naturally occurring degrees of misalignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm may impact risky decision-making, further extending accumulating evidence that sleep/circadian factors are tied to risk-taking preferences. Future studies will need to replicate findings and experimentally probe whether manipulating alignment influences risky decision making. Support (if any) R21AA023209; R01DA044143

Strategic Thinking: A Random Walk Into the Rabbit Hole

At its best, strategic thinking yields an advantage needed to beat an opponent. At the least, it protects the person from exploitation. In four studies, conducted in two countries, we used a simple number-guessing game, in which one respondent wins by guessing the number chosen by another. We show that people generate numbers nonrandomly, and, on the basis of this finding, we predict and find that nonrandom strategic choice is advantageous to the guesser if the chooser does not randomize either. As expected, respondents in the role of the guesser preferred to play a game in which they were to actively think of a number instead of randomizing if the chooser had to think of a number, too. Guessers did not prefer thinking if the chooser selected a number randomly. Having shown these limitations to strategic reasoning, we close with the observation that successful strategic reasoning may – at times – require the breaking of rules and being the first to do so.

Can we boost preschoolers’ inhibitory performance just by changing the way they respond?

Changing the way children make their response appears to sometimes, but not always, boost their inhibitory control – though interpreting existing findings is hampered by inconsistent methods and results. This study investigated the effects of delaying, and changing, the means of responding. Ninety-six preschoolers (mean age 46 months) completed tasks assessing inhibitory control, counterfactual reasoning, strategic reasoning, and false belief understanding. Children responded either immediately or after a delay, and either by pointing with their finger, or with a hand-held arrow. Delaying boosted performance on all tasks except false belief understanding; arrow-pointing only improved strategic reasoning. It is suggested that delay helps children work out the correct response; it is unlikely to help on tasks where this requirement is absent.