Under which conditions are changes in the treatment of people under involuntary commitment justified during the COVID-19 pandemic? An ethical evaluation of current developments in Germany

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 101615 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Gather ◽  
G. Juckel ◽  
T. Henking ◽  
S.A. Efkemann ◽  
J. Vollmann ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Alistair M. C. Isaac ◽  
Will Bridewell

It is easy to see that social robots will need the ability to detect and evaluate deceptive speech; otherwise they will be vulnerable to manipulation by malevolent humans. More surprisingly, we argue that effective social robots must also be able to produce deceptive speech. Many forms of technically deceptive speech perform a positive pro-social function, and the social integration of artificial agents will be possible only if they participate in this market of constructive deceit. We demonstrate that a crucial condition for detecting and producing deceptive speech is possession of a theory of mind. Furthermore, strategic reasoning about deception requires identifying a type of goal distinguished by its priority over the norms of conversation, which we call an ulterior motive. We argue that this goal is the appropriate target for ethical evaluation, not the veridicality of speech per se. Consequently, deception-capable robots are compatible with the most prominent programs to ensure that robots behave ethically.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 475-478
Author(s):  
Matthé Scholten ◽  
Jochen Vollmann

In this case commentary, we analyze ethical concerns that were raised in response to an interview with a woman with bipolar disorder who was under involuntary commitment. We focus on competence and voluntariness as two prerequisites for valid informed consent. We recommend that judgments of competence be based on whether prospective research participants sufficiently possess certain decision-making abilities. Based on this functional approach, we argue that manic symptoms need not undermine competence and that, even if we were to assume that the research participant became incompetent during the interview, this would not invalidate her consent retroactively. It would, however, compromise her ability to revoke her consent. We furthermore show that obtaining additional proxy consent for research participation may compromise the autonomy of service users who are competent to consent. Then we turn to the issue of voluntariness. Arguing that neither the great strength nor the external etiology of a desire compromises voluntariness, we propose that the voluntariness of a decision instead depends on whether the decision-maker endorses it on reflection. The researchers disclosed that prospective research participants’ decision about study participation would have no influence on the duration of the commitment or the quality of care. We contend that because of this neither coercion nor undue influence was exerted in the informed consent process. Nevertheless, there is an increased likelihood of perceived coercion and undue influence under conditions of involuntary commitment, and we close by suggesting some safeguards to prevent this.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-743
Author(s):  
Michael S. Sinha ◽  
John C. Messinger ◽  
Leo Beletsky

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