A serial supply chain of newsvendor problem with safety stocks under complete and partial information sharing

2012 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
pp. 412-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
In-Jae Jeong ◽  
V. Jorge Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Newsvendor Problem ◽  
Safety Stocks

MODELING THE IMPACT OF PARTIAL INFORMATION SHARING IN A THREE-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (05) ◽  
pp. 1350020 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHUPING LIU ◽  
QIUHONG ZHAO ◽  
SHOUYANG WANG ◽  
JIANMING SHI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Autoregressive Coefficient ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of partial information sharing in a three-echelon supply chain. Partial information sharing means that information sharing occurs only between the distributor and the retailer, but not between the distributor and the manufacturer. This paper contributes to the literature by summarizing the circumstances in which information sharing between the retailer and the distributor benefits the manufacturer. In addition, our study points out that such information sharing does not always bring benefits to the manufacturer and that in some cases the information sharing may harm the manufacturer. We explain the reasons why this can happen and give managerial intuition for our results. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate the impact of partial information sharing on the agents in the supply chain with the change of the autoregressive coefficient in the demand process.

INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS MULTIPLE BUYERS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240005 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIANGHUA WU ◽  
ANANTH IYER ◽  
PAUL V. PRECKEL ◽  
XIN ZHAI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Order Quantities ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Second Period

We model the impact of information visibility in a two-level supply chain consisting of independent retailers who share upstream supply. The manufacturer supplies similar products to the two retailers and each retailer serves its independent end market. Retailers face one period of demand and satisfy the demand by ordering in the first period or back-ordering some of the demand and satisfying it in the second period. The wholesale price in the second period is decreasing in the total order size across the two retailers in the first period. This decrease in wholesale price captures the market learning effect of aggregate orders that has been extensively documented in empirical literature. We use a game-theoretic framework to investigate the ex-ante incentives for retailers to share their private demand information. We show that: (1) retailers have no incentives to share information about their private values when equilibrium order quantities are interior, i.e., the order size is between zero and the demand; (2) partial information sharing may be the equilibrium strategy for retailers when equilibrium order quantities are binding on the demand. Finally, numerical examples are provided for illustration. This paper thus identifies conditions under which different levels of information sharing may be the equilibrium outcomes in a supply chain.

scholarly journals OVAP: A strategy to implement partial information sharing among supply chain retailers

2018 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 122-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Dominguez ◽  
Salvatore Cannella ◽  
Ana P. Barbosa-Póvoa ◽  
Jose M. Framinan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information

The impact of partial information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matan Shnaiderman ◽  
Fouad El Ouardighi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
The Impact
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