INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS MULTIPLE BUYERS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240005 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIANGHUA WU ◽  
ANANTH IYER ◽  
PAUL V. PRECKEL ◽  
XIN ZHAI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Order Quantities ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Second Period

We model the impact of information visibility in a two-level supply chain consisting of independent retailers who share upstream supply. The manufacturer supplies similar products to the two retailers and each retailer serves its independent end market. Retailers face one period of demand and satisfy the demand by ordering in the first period or back-ordering some of the demand and satisfying it in the second period. The wholesale price in the second period is decreasing in the total order size across the two retailers in the first period. This decrease in wholesale price captures the market learning effect of aggregate orders that has been extensively documented in empirical literature. We use a game-theoretic framework to investigate the ex-ante incentives for retailers to share their private demand information. We show that: (1) retailers have no incentives to share information about their private values when equilibrium order quantities are interior, i.e., the order size is between zero and the demand; (2) partial information sharing may be the equilibrium strategy for retailers when equilibrium order quantities are binding on the demand. Finally, numerical examples are provided for illustration. This paper thus identifies conditions under which different levels of information sharing may be the equilibrium outcomes in a supply chain.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

MODELING THE IMPACT OF PARTIAL INFORMATION SHARING IN A THREE-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (05) ◽  
pp. 1350020 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHUPING LIU ◽  
QIUHONG ZHAO ◽  
SHOUYANG WANG ◽  
JIANMING SHI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Autoregressive Coefficient ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of partial information sharing in a three-echelon supply chain. Partial information sharing means that information sharing occurs only between the distributor and the retailer, but not between the distributor and the manufacturer. This paper contributes to the literature by summarizing the circumstances in which information sharing between the retailer and the distributor benefits the manufacturer. In addition, our study points out that such information sharing does not always bring benefits to the manufacturer and that in some cases the information sharing may harm the manufacturer. We explain the reasons why this can happen and give managerial intuition for our results. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate the impact of partial information sharing on the agents in the supply chain with the change of the autoregressive coefficient in the demand process.

scholarly journals An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad ◽  
Qazi Khalid ◽  
Jaime Lloret ◽  
Antonio Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

The impact of partial information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matan Shnaiderman ◽  
Fouad El Ouardighi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
The Impact

The impact of information sharing on ordering policies to improve supply chain performances

2015 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Costantino ◽  
Giulio Di Gravio ◽  
Ahmed Shaban ◽  
Massimo Tronci
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Ordering Policies ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Improve Supply Chain

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of Multichannel Apparel Supply Chain Based on Showrooming and Information Sharing

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Shanshan Wang ◽  
Tian Luo ◽  
Daofang Chang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Forecast Error ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Clothing Industry ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Information Barriers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

This paper examines the influence of information forecast accuracy on the profits of the supply chain under the circumstance of a multichannel apparel supply chain. Due to the emergence of multichannel, customer showrooming behavior is becoming increasingly prevalent. For example, consumers usually buy garments online after experiencing the service in the traditional bricks and mortar in the clothing industry. Meanwhile, there are often information barriers between the manufacturer and the retailer, which will affect enterprise decision-making. To solve these problems, this paper mainly investigates the information sharing and customer showrooming phenomenon, which includes four models: no information sharing without showrooming model (NN), information sharing without showrooming model (SN), no information sharing with showrooming model (NS), and information sharing with showrooming model (SS). The numerical analysis shows that under the impact of the forecast error, information sharing between channel members is more favorable than no information sharing when parameters satisfy certain conditions. From the perspectives of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain, customer showrooming behavior will bring them less profit. These conclusions mean that the retailer should share information with the manufacturer and adjust their service level and sales price to alleviate the effect of showrooming.

scholarly journals Simulation Research on Information-Sharing Value of Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xiaheng Zhang ◽  
Zekai Lin ◽  
Lin Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Simulation Research ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Actual Evaluation ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

In the two-stage supply chain model, the incentive effect to the supplier’s sharing of demand information and performance evaluation and the effect of various parameters on the incentive effect of the supply chain are studied through a multiagent simulation model constructed for the purpose. It is found that the incentive coefficient of demand information-sharing degree, the number of selected suppliers, the order allocation coefficient, and the order proportion are positively related to the incentive effect of demand information sharing. So, the greater the demand information sharing is, the greater the impact of these parameters on the incentive effect is. Based on the demand information sharing, the supplier performance evaluation rules are shared, and when the actual evaluation rules are inconsistent with the supplier’s expectations, the incentive effect is further enhanced. Other parameters do not affect the incentive effect of demand information sharing and performance evaluation rule sharing.

scholarly journals Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11361
Author(s):  
Yangyang Huang ◽  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Rate ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
And Performance

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

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