A Generalized Approach to Solve Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for Practical Network Attack and Defense

Author(s):  
Liang Liu ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Shan Liao ◽  
Jiayong Liu ◽  
Zhenxue Wang
Author(s):  
Pranjal Pragya Verma ◽  
Mohammad Hesamzadeh ◽  
Ross Baldick ◽  
Darryl Biggar ◽  
K. Shanti Swarup ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Wang Yang ◽  
Liu Dong ◽  
Wang Dong ◽  
Xu Chun

Aiming at the problem that the current generation method of power network security defense strategy ignores the dependency relationship between nodes, resulting in closed-loop attack graph, which makes the defense strategy not generate attack path, resulting in poor defense effect and long generation response time of power network security defense strategy, a generation method of power network security defense strategy based on Markov decision process is proposed. Based on the generation of network attack and defense diagram, the paper describes the state change of attack network by using Markov decision-making process correlation principle, introduces discount factor, calculates the income value of attack and defense game process, constructs the evolutionary game model of attack and defense, solves the objective function according to the dynamic programming theory, obtains the optimal strategy set and outputs the final results, and generates the power network security defense strategy. The experimental results show that the proposed method has good defense effect and can effectively shorten the generation response time of power network security defense strategy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Wang Fangnian ◽  
Peng Gang ◽  
Che Wanfang ◽  
Niu Cong ◽  
Bai Yun ◽  
...  

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Serfes ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis

We generalize results of earlier work on learning in Bayesian games by allowing players to make decisions in a nonmyopic fashion. In particular, we address the issue of nonmyopic Bayesian learning with an arbitrary number of bounded rational players, i.e., players who choose approximate best-response strategies for the entire horizon (rather than the current period). We show that, by repetition, nonmyopic bounded rational players can reach a limit full-information nonmyopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NBNE) strategy. The converse is also proved: Given a limit full-information NBNE strategy, one can find a sequence of nonmyopic bounded rational plays that converges to that strategy.


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