An evolutionary game analysis of governments’ decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological compensation in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 251 ◽  
pp. 109592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Gao ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Weijun He ◽  
Fuhua Sun ◽  
Zhaofang Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Factors Influencing

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

scholarly journals Analysis on Decision-Making Changes of Multilevel Governments and Influencing Factors in Watershed Ecological Compensation

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuansheng Wang ◽  
Xiaojing Wu ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Chen Chi ◽  
Xin Gao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Protection Cost ◽  
The Impact

Watershed ecological compensation has been widely accepted as a system to promote the cooperation of various stakeholders to solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, but the existing research does not fully consider the impact of compensation fee paid by different governments on stakeholders’ decision-making. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between upstream governments, downstream governments, and the central government by using evolutionary game theory and determines the influence of different factors on the decision-making process of each player through simulation. The results show the following: (1) the initial probability significantly affects the decision-making behavior of each player; (2) daily supervision of the central government and the reduction of the environmental protection cost can promote the implementation of watershed ecological compensation; (3) the fine to downstream governments makes the decisions of the central government and downstream governments change periodically; and (4) the increase of ecological compensation fee urges downstream governments to choose noncompensation, and compensation fee paid by the central government has a critical value.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 1184
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Hehua Wang ◽  
Pei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Complex Products ◽  
Competition Condition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 588
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Ponnambalam Kumaraswamy ◽  
Hehua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Problem Size ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative System ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Processing Mechanism

This paper analyzed the effects of the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism on the decision-making processes, for the manufacturer and the supplier, regarding processing a problem in a new main manufacturer–supplier collaborative system using evolutionary game theory. Unpredicted problems may arise in the process of collaborative research and development (R&D) of complex products, like big passenger aircrafts, without any relative advanced contract, and either player will take risks to announce it. In addition to the factors of traditional cost and income, we take another two factors (i.e., the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism) into account in the examination of the problem processing mechanism. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can obtain the stable decision-making states of both players and how these two factors affect the problem processing mechanism. From the result, we find that the problem size has little effect on the two players’ decisions, while the problem processing mechanism has an impact when the experiences or the capacities of the manufacturer and the supplier are unbalanced. This paper contributes to manufacturer and supplier in a newly-established collaborative system to consider how to behave when unpredicted problems come.

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