scholarly journals Pareto optimality and Walrasian equilibria

2008 ◽  
Vol 341 (2) ◽  
pp. 1365-1381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zdzisław Naniewicz
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Walrasian Equilibria

Absence of Envy among “Neighbors” Can Be Enough

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Donnini ◽  
Marialaura Pesce
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Markets ◽  
Entire Society ◽  
Equivalence Theorems ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Equal Income ◽  
Walrasian Equilibria

AbstractWe assume that the set of agents is decomposed into several classes containing individuals related each other in some way, for example groups of neighbors. We propose a new definition of fairness by requiring efficiency and envy-freeness only within each group. We identify conditions under which absence of envy among “neighbors” is enough to ensure fairness in the entire society. We also show that equal-income Walrasian equilibria are the only fair allocations according to our notion, deriving as corollaries the equivalence theorems of Zhou (1992) and Cato (2010). The analysis is conducted in atomless economies as well as in mixed markets.

A novel feature selection approach with Pareto optimality for multi-label data

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guohe Li ◽  
Yong Li ◽  
Yifeng Zheng ◽  
Ying Li ◽  
Yunfeng Hong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Feature Selection ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Label Data ◽  
Selection Approach ◽  
Feature Selection Approach

Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 934-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Zeckhauser
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
The Political ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Economic Decisions

The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.

Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality

1973 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
George E. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality

How Well Do We Know Pareto Optimality?

1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay K. Mathur
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality

Some Sufficiency Conditions for Pareto-Optimal Control

1973 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 356-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Leitmann ◽  
W. Schmitendorf
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Optimal Control Problem ◽  
Control Problem ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Optimal Control Theory ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Vector Valued ◽  
Sufficiency Conditions

We consider the optimal control problem with vector-valued criterion (including cooperative games) and seek Pareto-optimal (noninferior) solutions. Scalarization results, together with modified sufficiency theorems from optimal control theory, are used to deduce sufficient conditions for Pareto-optimality. The utilization of these conditions is illustrated by various examples.

Pareto-optimality in Scheduling Problems

1999 ◽  
pp. 177-185
Author(s):  
Antonio F. Gómez-Skarmeta ◽  
Fernando Jiménez ◽  
Jesús Ibáñez
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Scheduling Problems
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