Two-stage coalition formation and radio resource allocation with Nash bargaining solution for inband underlaid D2D communications in 5G networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chih-Cheng Tseng ◽  
Jyun-Yao Shih
Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seyed Hadi Mousavi-Nasab ◽  
Jalal Safari ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob

Purpose Resource allocation has always been a critical problem with significant economic relevance. Many industries allocate the resources based on classical methods such as overall equipment effectiveness (OEE) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The lack of OEE factors’ weight, how it is defined, analyzed, interpreted and compared in OEE and selection of unrealistic weights, self-appraisal and disability of complete ranking in DEA are challenges that are possible to occur. These defects may result in unfair allocation of the resources. This study aims to overcome the mentioned weaknesses. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, an approach using a set of various DEA models and Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is designed to solve the resource allocation problem based on OEE, among a set of comparable and uniform DMUs (decision-making units) in a fair way. Findings The results show that a unique Pareto optimal allocation solution is obtained by the proposed DEA–NBS model among the DMUs. This allocation is more acceptable for players, because the allocation results are commonly determined by all DMUs rather than a specific one. Furthermore, the rankings achieved by the utilized methods and TOPSIS (technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution) are compared by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to validate the resource allocation plan. The findings indicate that the DEA–NBS method has the best correlation with the TOPSIS approach. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, no research has considered the use of DEA and NBS with OEE.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 207-217
Author(s):  
Nikolay A. Korgin ◽  
◽  
Vsevolod O. Korepanov ◽  

Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution (Vetschera, 2018), we analyze data obtained during experimental resource allocation gaming with Yang-Hajek's mechanism from the class of proportional allocation mechanisms. Games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensus-ended games show more but subtle attraction to Nash bargaining solution behavior. We discuss how these decisions correspond with other types of behavior actively exhibited by participants of this experiments — so-called constant behavior and with the end of negotiation process in games.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 216-226
Author(s):  
Nikolay A. Korgin ◽  
◽  
Vsevolod O. Korepanov ◽  

Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of the Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensusended games show light attraction to the Nash bargaining solution, it's less than we obtained in games with the mechanism of Yang-Hajek from another class of so-called proportional allocation mechanisms. We discuss differences of consensus-ended games from timeout-ended games, what decisions lead to the situations with the Nash bargaining value increasing and differences between balanced mechanism Groves-Ledyard and unbalanced mechanism Yang-Hajek.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 6463-6477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Moltafet ◽  
Roghayeh Joda ◽  
Nader Mokari ◽  
Mohammad Reza Sabagh ◽  
Michele Zorzi

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