Far but finite horizons promote cooperation in the Centipede game

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 191-199
Author(s):  
Eva M. Krockow ◽  
Briony D. Pulford ◽  
Andrew M. Colman
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian-Oliver Ewald ◽  
Aihua Zhang ◽  
Charles Nolan

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Van Der Ploeg ◽  
Giancarlo Marini
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1751-1773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J Healy

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)


2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 2129-2154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Mateos-Planas

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (14) ◽  
pp. 2299-2327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domagoj Tolić ◽  
Ricardo G. Sanfelice ◽  
Rafael Fierro
Keyword(s):  

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