Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma

2007 ◽  
Vol 247 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste André ◽  
Troy Day
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 3877-3885 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN HILBE
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Noisy Environment ◽  
Promising Candidate ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In search of strategies that boost cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPD), Contrite Tit for Tat is a promising candidate. It combines the necessary rigor in handling selfish strategies with contrition whenever the player has exploited its coplayer inadvertently. This paper shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Contrite Tit for Tat is not evolutionarily stable in general. In a relatively noisy environment with a low benefit of mutual cooperation it pays to be a defector. Additionally, errors in perception impede altruism notably.

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

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