Modeling Bayesian Inspection Game for Non-Performing Loan Problems

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

Naval Research Logistics (NRL) ◽

10.1002/nav.20167 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 53 (8) ◽

pp. 761-771 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

Ryusuke Hohzaki ◽

Diasuke Kudoh ◽

Toru Komiya

Keyword(s):

Inspection Game

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Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

Naval Research Logistics (NRL) ◽

10.1002/nav.21912 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 67 (6) ◽

pp. 438-452

Author(s):

Ederlina Ganatuin‐Nocon ◽

Tyrone Ang

Keyword(s):

Reaction Networks ◽

Inspection Game

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Erratum: Corrigendum: An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/srep09799 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Salahuddin M. Kamal ◽

Yas Al-Hadeethi ◽

Fouad A. Abolaban ◽

Fahad M. Al-Marzouki ◽

Matjaž Perc

Keyword(s):

Small World ◽

Small World Networks ◽

Labour Unions ◽

Inspection Game

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A COMPULSORY SMUGGLING MODEL OF INSPECTION GAME TAKING ACCOUNT OF FULFILLMENT PROBABILITIES OF PLAYERS' AIMS

Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan ◽

10.15807/jorsj.49.306 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 49 (4) ◽

pp. 306-318 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Ryusuke Hohzaki

Keyword(s):

Inspection Game

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An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/srep08881 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

Salahuddin M. Kamal ◽

Yas Al-Hadeethi ◽

Fouad A. Abolaban ◽

Fahad M. Al-Marzouki ◽

Matjaž Perc

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Power ◽

Evolutionary Process ◽

Small World ◽

Small World Network ◽

Small World Networks ◽

Labour Unions ◽

Long Run ◽

Inspection Game ◽

Overall Performance

Abstract We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.

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Game Theory

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199338801.013.7 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Heiko Rauhut

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Decision Making ◽

Theoretical Models ◽

Strategic Decision ◽

Crime And Punishment ◽

Sequential Games ◽

Universal Language ◽

The Social ◽

Inspection Game ◽

Practical Implications

Game theory analyzes strategic decision making of multiple interdependent actors and has become influential in economics, political science, and sociology. It provides novel insights in criminology because it is a universal language for the unification of the social and behavioral sciences and allows deriving new hypotheses from fundamental assumptions about decision making. This chapter first reviews foundations and assumptions of game theory, basic concepts, and definitions. This includes applications of game theory to offender decision making in different strategic interaction settings: simultaneous and sequential games and signaling games. Next, the chapter illustrates the benefits (and problems) of game theoretical models for the analysis of crime and punishment by providing an in-depth discussion of the “inspection game.” The formal analytics are described, point predictions are derived, and hypotheses are tested by laboratory experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications of results from the inspection game.

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