By delegating path control to end-hosts, future Internet architectures offer flexibility for path selection. However, a concern arises that the distributed routing decisions by endhosts, in particular load-adaptive routing, can lead to oscillations if path selection is performed without coordination or accurate load information. Prior research has addressed this problem by devising local path-selection policies that lead to global stability. However, little is known about the viability of these policies in the Internet context, where selfish end-hosts can deviate from a prescribed policy if such a deviation is beneficial from their individual perspective. In order to achieve network stability in future Internet architectures, it is essential that end-hosts have an incentive to adopt a stability-oriented path-selection policy.
In this work, we perform the first incentive analysis of the stability-inducing path-selection policies proposed in the literature. Building on a game-theoretic model of end-host path selection, we show that these policies are in fact incompatible with the self-interest of end-hosts, as these strategies make it worthwhile to pursue an oscillatory path-selection strategy. Therefore, stability in networks with selfish endhosts must be enforced by incentive-compatible mechanisms. We present two such mechanisms and formally prove their incentive compatibility.
Incentivizing stable path selection in future Internet architectures
