Foreign aid and political instability in resource-rich countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 277-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Ravetti ◽  
Mare Sarr ◽  
Tim Swanson
2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxanda Berlinschi ◽  
Julien Daubanes

AbstractThis paper proposes a theoretical analysis of the joint impact of foreign aid and oil taxes on the revenues of a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class, oil exporting country (South). Without coordination, oil taxes are strictly higher in the North and the global allocation of oil is inefficient. Moreover, oil taxes in the North extract some of the South's oil rents, undoing the revenue transfers from foreign aid. We show that a policy coordination mechanism reduces inefficiencies and improves global welfare.


Author(s):  
Szu-Ning Ping ◽  
Yi-Ting Wang ◽  
Wen-Yang Chang

Abstract The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China's resource-related development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the study finds that China's resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of recipient countries' horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction, to improve China's own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in recipient countries.


2007 ◽  
pp. 4-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Polterovich ◽  
V. Popov ◽  
A. Tonis

This paper compares various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanisms is associated with market imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that resource abundant countries have on average lower budget deficits and inflation, and higher foreign exchange reserves. Besides, lower domestic fuel prices that are typical for resource rich countries have a positive effect on long-term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy consumption. On top of that resource abundance allows to reduce income inequalities. So, on the one hand, resource wealth turns out to be conducive to growth, especially in countries with strong institutions. However, on the other hand, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions and to overvalued real exchange rates. On balance, there is no solid evidence that resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, but there is evidence that they grow more slowly than could have grown with the right policies and institutions.


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